

Lessons Learned Study:

Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations

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This discussion paper reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations.

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Acronyms Used

APT	Advanced Planning Team (in the EC)
AU	African Union
CANADEM	Canada's Civilian Reserve
CHAD OT	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department Operations Team (in DFID)
CRT	Civil Response Team (in the EU)
DDR	Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department for Safety and Security
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy (in the EU)
FCI	France Coopération Nationale
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
ILAC	International Legal Assistance Consortium
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OSCE	Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe
PCRU	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (in the UK)
PHP	Personal History Profile
PMSS	Personnel Management and Support Service
REACT	Rapid Emergency Assistance Teams (in the OSCE)
REDR-IHE	Registered Engineers for Emergency Relief and the International Health Exchange
RDR	Rapid Deployment Roster (in DPKO)
RPS	Recruitment and Placement Section (in PMSS)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAFDEM	Southern African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions
S-CRS	US Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SEP	Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TAIEX	Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument (of the EC)
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
ZIF	Centre for International Peace Operations (in Germany)

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1. Executive summary

In response to quantitative and qualitative increases in demand, DPKO is developing its Nucleus database as a rostering tool.

The rise of multidimensional peacekeeping has posed quantitatively and qualitatively new demands for the provision of civilian capabilities in peace operations. DPKO has sought to respond to these new demands by expanding and improving its civilian recruitment mechanisms, including through the development of rosters of civilian experts. The current trend is to develop its principal recruitment tool – a database called Nucleus – into a master roster of 24 occupational groups and 12 grades. DPKO is increasingly using open-ended Generic Vacancy Announcements, launched through its website, to populate the Nucleus roster through the UN’s Galaxy on-line application system. Candidates that have been cleared for a position/grade combination can then be called on directly when a specific vacancy arises. One of the enduring challenges facing DPKO civilian recruitment is to manage the interface between the vast number (over 150,000 a year) of applications received through Galaxy and the ‘cleared’ population of Nucleus. This places a premium on minimising the number of unsuitable applications and maximising the efficiency of screening strategies and tools.

This should also help address demands for rapid deployment for core mission positions.

In response to the demand for rapid deployment, particularly in mission start-up, DPKO piloted the development of a Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR) from 2003 to 2005. The roster included self-nominated experienced DPKO staff that could be rapidly deployed for a period of up to three months to undertake critical tasks principally for mission start-up. However, like other rosters developed to provide rapid ‘surge’ response within the UN system e.g. OCHA’s Emergency Response Roster, the RDR met with limited success because of insufficient commitment to the mechanism which undermined its credibility and efficiency. Consequently, DPKO is currently exploring alternative approaches to the rapid recruitment challenge. These include proposals to develop a cadre of some 1000-1500 career peacekeepers that would provide DPKO with a reliable source of experienced personnel, able to deploy anywhere at short notice to fill core mission positions. It is also seeking to adapt the Nucleus roster to better serve as a rapid deployment tool by including information on candidates’ availability and upgrading search functions.

DPKO aims to develop stand-by arrangements to mobilise external expertise but efforts in this direction have been limited. DPKO drafted a generic

Efforts to mobilise external expertise have been designed to complement rather than feed into DPKO recruitment.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that called for member states or agencies to offer specialist experts that could be called on to support regular DPKO positions in response to the occasional need for niche specialists, but uptake has been poor and no agreements have been reached. This is possibly because the initiative was designed to complement regular DPKO recruitment mechanisms rather than feed into them¹. As such, the initiative falls short of DPKO's ambition to draw on the widest possible range of talent through, *inter alia*, developing MoUs with member states and agencies. Better linkage with other UN departments and agencies and external roster managers could help DPKO populate its Nucleus roster with suitable candidates and serve as a back-up mechanism for identifying specialists where normal procedures have failed to do so.

Some states maintain small pre-selected rosters of civilian experts for secondment to international operations

Parallel initiatives to raise and deploy civilian capabilities in peace operations have been launched in a variety of fora, alongside the expansion of existing mechanisms. These include initiatives by regional organisations, notably the EU and the OSCE, pre-existing and new national initiatives, as well as non-governmental initiatives. Unlike the UN, the majority of professional personnel in OSCE and EU missions are seconded by member states. Fears that this system would generate political patronage candidates have not been realised mainly because final selection decisions are made by the regional organisation on the basis of merit. Rather, states have increasingly sought to improve the range and quality of the candidates they submit, including through the establishment of national rosters and efforts to train their members. The national roster model used in Germany, Norway and Switzerland, for example, seeks to maintain a relatively small pool (under 1000) of pre-selected, trained, trusted and relatively 'ready' experts that can be called upon for funded deployments on bilateral missions or in response to requests from international organisations.

While others have developed large databases of experts and adopted competitive screening techniques

Another model of roster management that has been adopted by some national roster managers and international NGOs e.g. CANADEM and RedR-IHE focuses on the development of flexible and cost-efficient supply systems. These rosters tend to be large, with 8,000 to 20,000 members, and are populated through open on-line applications. Emphasis is placed on competitive just-in-time screening using electronic search tools to identify the best available candidates in response to a particular request rather than on pre-screening to ensure the roster population meets minimum standards. This roster model offers valuable lessons for increasing the efficiency of qualitative screening that could be applied in the DPKO context. Options to improve efficiency of screening include the use of 'killer questions' to weed out unsuitable candidates at the application stage, the development of more powerful search tools to enable more qualitative electronic screening, and the

¹ Experts under such stand-by arrangements were not to be considered DPKO staff, could not conduct regular DPKO functions, and could not apply for DPKO positions for at least six months after their deployment.

DPKO could benefit from adopting a more competitive approach to roster management

and from linking with external rosters to increase the sources of recruitment.

This could, in time, lead to the sub-contracting out of pre-selection tasks to external roster managers.

This study aims to map international, national and NGO initiatives for the deployment of civilian capabilities to peace operations and to identify the potential for UN engagement with them.

potential use of consultants to build capacity in technical clearance in times of heavy demand, including mission start-up.

With only a finite number of suitable experts and an increasing demand for their expertise, it seems sensible that roster managers establish linkages to make the most predictable and efficient use of available talent. While it is broadly acknowledged that better linkage with external rosters should increase the scope and quality of the pool of civilian experts that DPKO could draw on, these linkages have yet to be developed. The principal obstacles to inter-linking include DPKO's commitment to direct applications, the decision not to allow 'gratis' or seconded personnel, and inter-agency fragmentation and the competition that it brings. In the short to medium term DPKO could nevertheless develop links with other UN departments or agencies, national rosters and international non-governmental rosters through agreements that would provide for external roster managers to select suitable candidates in response to DPKO requests. These applications would follow the normal procedures through Galaxy, but could be flagged as referrals within the system. In the longer term, and should such arrangements be found to be effective, DPKO could consider outsourcing the pre-selection of candidates to short-list standard with external roster managers with comprehensive databases and a proven track record of merit-based selection. This should help consolidate and generate roster capacity at a local or national level, while liberating limited DPKO resources for outreach to identify and screen candidates from countries that do not have such rosters in place.

2. Introduction

2.1 Rationale, scope and methodology of the study²

Objective

The aim of this study is to map current initiatives for the establishment and deployment of civilian capabilities to peace operations at the international, national and non-governmental level and the relations, if any, established between these initiatives and UN civilian peacekeeping personnel recruitment mechanisms. The study also aims to identify the potential scope of future UN engagement with civilian capabilities initiatives.

Background

The rise of multidimensional peacekeeping has posed quantitatively and qualitatively new demands for the provision of civilian capabilities in peace operations. The UN has sought to respond to these new demands by expanding and improving its civilian recruitment mechanisms, including

² This section is an abridged version of the study's Terms of Reference, elaborated by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, DPKO.

through the development of its rosters of civilian experts. Similar parallel initiatives to raise and deploy civilian capabilities in peace operations have been launched in a variety of fora, alongside the expansion of existing mechanisms. These include initiatives by regional organisations (e.g. EU civilian crisis management goals, and the OSCE REACT system), pre-existing and new national initiatives (NORDEM, CANADEM, UK PCRU and US CRS), as well as non-governmental initiatives, e.g. ILAC.

The diversity of parallel initiatives raises questions of complementarity, duplication and overlap

The common objective of these initiatives is to enable the deployment of appropriately skilled and trained civilian personnel to peace operations within an efficient timeframe. Beyond this shared goal, however, these differ substantially in scope, structure and content. Such diversity raises questions of complementarity, duplication and overlap. For the UN, the challenge is to a) obtain a detailed picture of the scope and content of each initiative, b) assess possible compatibility with UN standards and systems in order to c) fruitfully engage with compatible potential partners in facilitating the rapid deployment of suitably skilled civilian personnel to UN peace operations.

Scope and methodology

The study collected empirical information and data on the objectives, structure and functioning of civilian capabilities including i.a., funding, selection and vetting procedures, civilian profiles and job descriptions, training, roster management and rapid deployment capability. The information was collected through interviews, internet and document review.

Structure

This study takes as a starting point the ambition of DPKO to develop rosters for the deployment of civilian experts and to expand the pool of civilian experts it can draw on. To this end it explores, in section 3, the opportunities and obstacles to the development of rosters within DPKO, and outlines, in section 4, some examples of international, national or NGO initiatives to develop rosters of civilian experts for peace operations. Section 5 explores how DPKO might learn from the experience of other rosters and identifies options for further interlinking.

but engagement with external rosters should expand the pool of civilian experts DPKO can draw on.

2.2 Context: Current challenges for DPKO recruitment

Over the past decade peace operations have increased in number and scope resulting in at least three recruitment challenges for DPKO:

1) quantitative increases in demand

The demands on DPKO have proven larger than predicted. Even as recently as 2000, the Brahimi report envisaged DPKO establishing one large mission a year. Practice has consistently exceeded these expectations with, for example, four missions launched in 2004. There are presently 17 UN peace operations deployed. The growth in UN peacekeeping

Over the past decade, the quantitative demand for civilian experts has increased beyond expectations.

operations means that the annual budget for UN peacekeeping has grown from under \$1 billion in the 1990s to approaching \$5 billion in 2005. Quantitative demands on personnel have increased commensurately with a current total personnel complement of over almost 85,000, including 13,000 civilians³. Whereas in the early 1990s DPKO employed 3500 international staff, this figure has now more than doubled. Even so, the ratio between personnel of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to those in the field has declined from 1:48 in 1998 to approximately 1: 135 in 2005. Consequently, one challenge for DPKO recruitment relates to managing the increased volume in demand. This has placed a premium on expanding the size of the pool of personnel that DPKO can draw on, and on introducing efficiency gains by moving from recruitment in response to post-specific vacancy announcements to the use of rosters of personnel. It also requires the increased use electronic filtering tools, including search engines, to assist recruitment staff in identifying suitable candidates from the ever-growing pool of applicants.

2) increases in qualitative scope

The range of civilian expertise that DPKO requires has also increased as DPKO has taken on more post conflict stabilization tasks.

A second significant trend in peace operations over the past decade has been an expansion in the scope of peacekeeping missions to support and develop a widening range of civilian capacities to help stabilize post-conflict situations and secure the transition from war to peace. Peacekeeping is increasingly multidimensional and DPKO has played a substantial operational role over the past decade in addressing multiple civilian post conflict challenges – although often as *ad hoc* or stop gap measure⁴. Moreover the establishment of UN transitional authorities in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 also brought new qualitative demands for civilian capabilities in peace operations. The principal area for the expansion of DPKO activities has been in the area of law and order and in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts. More specifically, these include tasks such as: police institutional development (including planning, training and mentoring); police monitoring; the development of community policing; corrections; justice and rule of law; mine action and DDR. Moreover, multi-dimensional peacekeeping requires a number of civilian experts providing advisory support in areas such as political affairs, human rights, gender issues, best practices, HIV/AIDS, communications and reporting as well as civilian mission support personnel. Consequently, one of the current challenges for DPKO recruitment is to expand the qualitative scope of its civilian technical expert pool. Indeed, DPKO continues to experience difficulties in

³ As of 30 November 2005.

⁴ For an analysis of DPKO's role in civilian post-conflict capacity building see 'DPKO and Civilian Post-Conflict Capacities' a Discussion Paper by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, May 2004.

recruiting personnel for these relatively new roles⁵. Shortfalls and unfilled vacancies in these areas remain commonplace.

DPKO still experiences difficulties in recruiting for these relatively new roles

While DPKO has introduced generic vacancy announcements to build up its internal rosters of experts in these occupational groups, it still lacks effective targeting mechanisms for attracting applications from technical experts in these specialist fields. Moreover, some argue that DPKO's use of short-term contracts means that it loses out to other UN agencies with similar specialist requirements.⁶

A second aspect of the specialist deployment challenge relates to the perceived need to augment core mission posts and functions with specialist, temporary support functions performed by **external** experts. This has led to the 2004 initiative to agree Memoranda of Understanding with Member States and other relevant agencies to establish a stand-by roster of international experts, individuals and/or teams of professionals and technicians. This initiative is still in development, however, and no agreements have been concluded yet.

DPKO also experiences difficulties in finding suitable candidates for some high-level positions (P5 and up), where this is at least in part because DPKO terms and conditions (salaries) are less competitive than those of other agencies working in the field.

3) increased demand for rapid deployment

DPKO continues to explore options to improve rapid deployment although the initiative to create an in-house rapid deployment roster was not successful.

An increasingly broad range of capabilities is needed to support the greater number, range and complexity of activities that DPKO now performs. One essential capability need is for rapid deployment and recruitment mechanisms. Given the time needed to approve posts and funding for new missions, and thereafter process vacancy announcements and select candidates for mission positions, it was deemed essential to the successful start-up of a mission to augment existing recruitment arrangements with mechanisms to fast-track the recruitment of core mission start-up personnel. DPKO is still exploring the ways of improving **in-house** rapid deployment for mission start-ups or to provide surge capacity, *inter alia* through the development of a Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR), but these initiatives have so far met with limited success

⁵ With the exception of human rights and political affairs, for which there is no shortfall of qualified candidates.

⁶ Some Recruitment and Placement Service (RPS) officers report that in areas of competence which are required by a number of UN departments i.e. security officers, logistics, DDR officers and human rights advisors DPKO, which offers mainly short-term '300 series' contracts, sometimes loses out to other agencies that tend to offer longer-term contracts. However, it is also the experience of RPS officers that some candidates prefer to work for DPKO as this is seen as a bridge to the UN Secretariat. Also, once candidates are briefed on the modality of extension of contracts after an initial six months, subject to performance and availability of a post, their concerns are often alleviated.

and the 2003/2004 RDR pilot initiative has been suspended. Instead, DPKO now plans to identify staff for rapid deployment by introducing functionalities that allow it to ‘flag’ candidates that are available on short notice within its Nucleus roster of candidates⁷.

2.3 Can the development of rosters help address these challenges?

The benefits of rosters include speed, transparency, homogeneity, accessibility and merit-based selection.

The civilian recruitment challenges posed by the changing nature of peace operations are also common to member states and other international organisations engaged in peace support operations. In light of the widespread difficulties in identifying and recruiting specialist experts in a range of relatively new civilian post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction tasks, the development of rosters is widely seen to be one of the most efficient responses to the increasing demand for a greater number and range of (potentially rapidly deployable) civilian personnel. Once a roster is well populated with suitable candidates, the roster mechanism offers obvious benefits as a recruitment tool. These include speed, transparency, homogeneity, accessibility and low maintenance costs⁸. Rosters also encourage merit-based selection since the easiest way of filtering candidates is by searching for relevant qualifications and experience. Consequently many member states have developed, or are in the process of developing, rosters or pools of civilian experts for tasks related to peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Similarly, some NGOs have taken on the task of developing and maintaining rosters to help serve the recruitment needs of a number of international and non-governmental actors active in relief and post-conflict capacity building. The ambition to streamline the recruitment process through the development of rosters within DPKO is therefore fully in-line with international trends. Unsurprisingly it was suggested in the Brahimi report and formed one of the building blocks of the global civilian staffing strategy prepared in May 2001.

The largest cost in roster management is the screening of candidates for pre-selection.

However, while there are obvious benefits in a roster system, the development of rosters inevitably involves considerable costs. The most significant human resource and financial cost of roster management relates to the process of screening and ‘clearing’ candidates to place on the roster. These costs vary with the size of the roster, the number of applications to it, and the screening strategies that roster managers adopt. When, as is the case in the UN, the number of applications to the roster (through Galaxy) is vast, the human resource costs of pre-screening may become a limiting factor or ‘bottleneck’

⁷ Candidates on the roster will be contacted periodically to confirm their interest and ascertain their availability to this end.

⁸ These will vary depending on the size of the roster. The costs of maintaining a (small) national roster of under 2000 members has been estimated by CANADEM to be under \$150,000 a year. This includes software costs (under \$1000) as well as personnel and outreach costs, (assuming that the rosters are established in countries with relatively low costs of living). By contrast, CANADEM, based in Canada with around 8000 database members has a budget of \$500,000 and the international roster RedR-IHE, based in London with 20,000 members, operates on a budget of \$350,000.

A number of strategies have been employed to control costs, including:

in the system. This raises a number of questions relating cost efficiency. A number of strategies have been employed by roster managers to limit the human resource/screening costs. These include:

- *limiting the size of the roster*

Most national rosters surveyed here include less than 1000 members. To maintain rosters of this size, one can expect to need to select anywhere between 10 and fifty new members a month. This is a sufficiently low number to enable most small national roster managers to conduct fairly extensive screening of applicants before a member is placed on a register, where this may also involve, in some cases, face to face interviews and participation in induction training courses (Norway, Germany, Switzerland). This is appropriate to developing a cadre of pre-selected personnel who can be drawn on quickly (without much further screening when a position arises). While there may be a cost-incentive to keep roster numbers to a relatively small and manageable size, it is imperative that rosters are constantly updated with new members entered if the utility of the roster is to be maintained. This means that roster managers should resist the temptation to close the roster to new members and rather manage the growth of rosters either by employing more cost-efficient growth strategies and screening strategies and/or additional resources. In the case of DPKO, where the pressure to increase the size of the rosters (through applications from Galaxy) is intense, DPKO has sought to limit the growth of the roster by ruling that all candidates are removed from the roster after one year, after which they are free to re-apply by submitting an updated Personal History Profile. Moreover, careful consideration is being given to how best to adapt screening strategies to minimize costs without compromising the quality of those ultimately selected (see next point).

- *adopting just-in-time, competitive screening*

Roster managers who maintain large rosters of candidates do not generally screen people thoroughly as they enter the roster. Rather screening is driven by demand and paper screening is reserved for those who have been identified as potential candidates though electronic searches in response to specific requests. While applications to a roster will be checked (often electronically) to ensure that information is complete and that minimum requirements (if any) have been met, thorough screening, including interviews, reference checking and in some cases testing, is reserved for those roster members who have been identified using electronic search tools as most suitable for a particular placement (e.g. CANADEM and REDR-IHE.) Such on-going just-in-time screening also helps ensure that the

Limiting the size of the roster through maintaining a narrow geographical focus or high minimum requirements for entry.

Adopting just-in-time competitive screening that uses electronic search tools to identify the best candidates when they are needed, rather than screening for eligibility to enter the roster.

information contained in the roster is up to date. DPKO currently engages in on-going initial screening of applications to ascertain whether applicants meet the minimum requirements in which case they are entered into the roster of initially cleared Nucleus candidates. It is now also exploring the use of more competitive screening strategies that seek out the best candidates, rather than those that meet minimum requirements only. Such competitive screening techniques exploit the technological advances in database software and search engines and help generate short-lists of candidates worthy of further technical screening.

- *reducing costs of ‘in-house’ screening through the use of consultants and surge arrangements*

Given that screening is human-resource intensive, many roster managers have sought to keep a check on costs through outsourcing. CANADEM, for example, has a pool of approximately 35 consultants with specialist technical expertise and experience that it can call on for rapid screening with set fees per number of applications/persons screened. Another means organisations deploy to introduce flexibility and reduce human resource costs of screening is to develop flexible structures that can deal with surge demands. For example, the OSCE has a regular staff of six recruitment officers dealing with secondment issues, but can more than double this capacity in rapid deployment or surge situations, when the recruitment section can be augmented with personnel drawn from other areas of the Secretariat or missions. While DPKO does not use consultants for screening it has surge arrangements in place whereby additional resources are hired to assist with recruitment for mission start-up.

- *Incremental screening in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity*

Subsidiarity is the principle that decisions should always be taken at the lowest possible level or closest to where they will have their effect. When applied to roster management it suggests that initial screening of certain skill sets, such as interpersonal skills or the validity of many resume details, should best be done by those most familiar with local conditions, culture and standards. In contrast, other criteria that have a bearing on the suitability of candidates in relation to the specific vacancy, can best be judged by staff within the recruiting organisation. This incremental approach to screening is also more efficient in terms of cost, especially where the international organisations do not bear the costs of initial screening at the local level.

Building flexible and efficient screening capacity, including through the use of consultants and surge arrangements

Promoting incremental screening whereby the verification of certain skill sets is done locally and position screening is done in the recruiting organisation

- *Developing targeted advertising strategies*

Developing targeted advertising strategies to attract applications from a broader range of sources

A central challenge for all roster managers is how to reconcile the need to attract the best quality candidates from the widest possible range of sources with the cost-saving imperative to prevent or filter out applications from unsuitable candidates as efficiently and fairly as possible. Where rosters accept direct applications, many have responded to this challenge by adopting targeted advertising strategies using specialist press. This is also an ambition of DPKO. However, the screening costs associated with processing direct applications are inevitably high, and some roster managers have found it to be prohibitive, compared with other roster growth strategies. For example, in the UK the PCRU future strategy document notes that ‘It is almost certain that advertising, even in specialist journals, would attract a deluge of unsuitable applications. Filtering them would be a major task. But PCRU will keep this option in view.’ This processing challenge is already one that DPKO struggles with in light of the hundreds of thousands of applications it receives each year in response to advertisements on the UN jobs web-site, although it is in the process of introducing new automated techniques to help filter out unsuitable candidates (see below).

- *Introducing automated, electronic techniques to filter out unsuitable applications*

Introducing automated techniques to weed out unsuitable applications and identify the strongest ones.

One way of limiting the number of unsuitable applications that will need to be screened for roster membership is to identify a number of minimum requirements according which some pre-screening can be done automatically. One such technique is the use of ‘killer questions’ in on-line application procedures. If a candidate answers negatively to one of these ‘killer questions’ (such as ‘do you have two years field experience’?) as they fill in the on-line application form, they are effectively barred from submitting the application⁹. Alternatively, all applications can be entered into the roster and weeding out of candidates that do not meet the minimum requirements can be done through the database software or search engines on the basis of key word searches relating to experience, skills, or any other specific requirement of the post. This is for instance the practice of the recruitment NGO RedR-IHE. In the case of DPKO, the search functions of the Nucleus database are still limited, but DPKO is exploring their development as well as the possible use of search engines to allow for more targeted searches of its roster population. Similarly, filtering during the application process could be introduced

⁹ Similarly, in on-line applications systems e.g. RedR-IHE applications that are incomplete generate an automated response, requesting that the candidate complete the application, and are otherwise discounted.

(through the Galaxy application system) so as to reduce the number of unsuitable applications that are automatically entered into DPKO's Nucleus roster.

- *Pooling personnel information*

Sharing personnel information between roster managers is an efficient roster growth strategy but can be hampered by issues of data ownership and protection.

Sharing relevant personnel information held by other agencies, nations or organisations is a cost-efficient roster growth strategy in so far as the populations in question already come pre-selected whereby much of the initial screening work has effectively been done by another organisation. Sensibly, this is another building block of DPKO's 2001 global civilian personnel strategy, which foresees expanding the sources of recruitment *inter alia* by creating Memoranda of Understanding with UN agencies, agencies and member states.

Where there is sufficient political will and organisational commitment, personnel rosters have effectively been pooled (see boxes below for international and national examples). Expanding a pool of relevant experts through sharing data is a cost-efficient option, albeit one that requires political buy-in and/or, in the case of 'buying' personnel data from external service providers, some financial costs. Indeed, overcoming concerns over political control and/or data protection is a central challenge for any efforts – international or inter-agency – to pooling personnel information (see section 5.1. below).

Box 1. An example of international pooling

The **International Humanitarian Partnership** effectively combines national personnel pools from Sweden (the Swedish Rescue Services Agency) Denmark (The Danish Emergency Management Agency), Finland (the Finnish Ministry of Interior, Finnish Rescue Force), Norway (the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning) and the United Kingdom (the United Kingdom's Department for International Development) in order to participate in international relief efforts as part of a team or independently.

Box 2. National examples of pooling

One example of the successful merging of rosters is the creation of a roster of deployable civilian experts in the UK's Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). This roster is being developed from merging relevant data from the rosters managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development as well as rosters managed by Crown Agents (a commercial company), which in turn uses data from external providers including the

international humanitarian NGO RedR-IHE. Similarly, CANADEM -- Canada's civilian reserve -- has become a large one-stop roster by absorbing a number of other rosters such as the CIDA and Election Canada observation rosters.

Screening strategies that are appropriate for rosters of in-house or funded deployments are not appropriate for large rosters that serve as recruitment services for international agencies or NGOs.

One generic lesson that can be gleaned from this introductory overview is that strategies that are relevant for the development of rosters for funded deployments, which are designed to provide a small pool of pre-selected, trusted or in-house and relatively 'ready' experts, are not as appropriate for rosters which are essentially recruitment services, and as such have developed cost efficient just-in-time supply systems to identify the best candidates from a broad range of sources. The former *may* be more suitable for managing the deployments of a relatively small cadre of personnel – often civil servants – whereas the latter offers valuable lessons in how to efficiently identify strong candidates, from a wide range of sources, on the basis of merit.

3. The role of Rosters in DPKO Recruitment

3.1 DPKO recruitment and the Nucleus Roster

The Nucleus database is DPKO's principal recruitment tool.

Since July 2004 Galaxy has been used for advertising and collecting applications for all DPKO jobs via the website jobs.un.org. This process requires that the candidate register with Galaxy and complete an online Personal History Profile (PHP) form. All applications made through Galaxy for DPKO positions are automatically, within 24 hours, deposited in DPKO's recruitment database -- Nucleus. Applications can be in response to post-specific announcements or generic announcements with no fixed deadline. Increasingly generic or open advertisements are used on Galaxy to avoid the need to screen the same candidates applying to several post-specific vacancies. Generic Vacancy Announcements are not necessarily linked to vacancies but help Nucleus serve its rostering purpose. Candidates that have been in the Nucleus database for a year are automatically removed from the database, but can always re-apply using the same electronic procedure.

It is being developed to serve a rostering function for which it was not originally designed.

The Nucleus database is a roster of candidates for DPKO positions and is DPKO's principal recruitment tool. It is unique in the UN system and was developed initially in conjunction with the advertisement of a Compendium of Vacancies open to internal mission staff. Indeed, the primary advantage of Nucleus is that it is integrated with a vacancy-tracking module, a staffing table module, and various human resources databases (IMIS, FPMS). Although Galaxy is also used as a selection tool for UN Secretariat staff, it was found that Galaxy was not sufficiently rapid and flexible to serve as a selection tool for DPKO and consequently Nucleus was developed in-house as a tailor-made response to DPKO's recruitment needs. However, its search functionality is

well below that of recruitment software industry standards, since it was not initially designed for this purpose.

3.1.1 Developing the functionality of Nucleus

Nucleus is being constantly adapted, including through efforts to improve its rudimentary search functions.

The functionality of Nucleus continues to be adapted in response to changing needs. While Nucleus first served as a register of applicants for specific vacancies, it is currently being developed to serve as a roster of vetted candidates. Thus, increasingly recruitment officers consult Nucleus to identify potential candidates before deciding whether it is necessary to launch a post-specific vacancy announcement. Consequently, the search functions of Nucleus have been improved and the database can now be searched for: job grade and title, whether the candidate is already a UN employee, the level of clearance, gender, age, language knowledge, nationality, and some keywords relating to substantive competence or skill sets. It is DPKO's intention to further improve the Nucleus search functions. For example, the new Galaxy website for DPKO that is in development will enable candidates to state 'mission preferences' thereby enabling PMSS recruitment officers to identify not only who in the roster is qualified and cleared for a potential position but who may also be interested in it. Moreover, DPKO intends to develop a search engine to allow for more thorough electronic screening of applications.

The scope of the roster has been increased and now divided into 24 occupational groups.

Nucleus has also been adapted to respond to changing operational needs. Currently jobs are divided into 24 occupational groups with over 400 job titles and job descriptions. This represents a significant increase in the number and scope of job descriptions from the early 1990s. Within these occupational groups, the areas of competence that are newest to DPKO are also generally those with the fewest candidates. These include the areas of rule of law, corrections, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and human rights.

3.1.2 Pre-selection and clearance

All candidates for DPKO positions must be cleared for eligibility and then cleared for suitability by substantive partners.

All candidates in nucleus are subject to a two-stage clearance process. The first stage, initial clearance, involves checking that a candidates eligibility for the position – that they meet all minimum requirements. This is performed by 13 professional recruitment officers in the Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS)¹⁰. The second stage, technical clearance, involves checking the candidates' suitability for a position. This is performed by technical or substantive partners and involves an informed evaluation of the candidates experience and suitability for the position.

Currently, within the Nucleus population over 8,000 candidates have been initially cleared, of which approximately 4500 candidates have also been technically cleared. Given that DPKO issues a large number of vacancy

¹⁰ These professionals also perform the functions of desk officers for recruitment matters for one or more missions.

Although DPKO receives over 150,000 applications a year, only a small proportion (8000) are initially cleared, of which half as many are also technically cleared.

The Galaxy system generates too many applications for PMSS to screen in a timely manner.

Improving electronic screening tools should increase the efficiency of screening, but given the volume of applications, timely screening will remain a formidable challenge.

Within the UN system rosters have been used to provide surge capacity or meet needs in specialised competencies.

announcements – over 500 from January to October 2005, in response to which it received over 150,000 applications – the percentage of the Nucleus population with initial or technical clearance remains low. There are two explanations for this. Firstly, the clearance process is human-resource intensive and, with a limited number of 13 recruitment officers, there will inevitably be limitations on the number of candidates that can be screened at any one time. In addition, PMSS argues that the principal obstacle to increasing the Nucleus population of cleared candidates is the quality of the candidates.

In short, the Galaxy application system generates too many applications for PMSS staff to screen in a timely manner, and is inefficient in so far as the vast majority of these applications are unsuitable. Moreover, the current electronic screening tools are inadequate. The Nucleus database was not designed as a rostering tool and its search functions remain limited. DPKO has therefore yet to fully exploit software capacities that would enable electronic filtering on the basis of experience, education, languages or any other specific position requirements, although it has intentions to do so. Indeed, it is soon to establish a dedicated Recruitment and Outreach Unit which will, *inter alia*, to focus improving qualitative evaluation of candidates on the roster.

Even once PMSS has developed better electronic pre-screening tools, maintaining and managing the Nucleus Roster will be an enduring human resource-intensive challenge, given that the final screening phases require informed and considered judgments by personnel familiar with organizational and mission needs. If PMSS human resources are not to be increased over time in response to the ever-increasing numbers of positions and applications, the sustainability of this open mechanism for feeding candidates into the Nucleus roster is questionable.

3.2 Specialised rosters within the UN system

While the development of the Nucleus database into a standing roster is central to DPKO's current recruitment strategy, the Nucleus system has not traditionally been regarded as a roster tool. Rather, within the UN system rosters have generally been established to meet more limited short-term recruitment needs in specialised competencies i.e. election observation and mine action or refugee protection. Moreover, in some cases, as with the 'Protection Surge Capacity Project', the management of rosters and recruitment from them has been outsourced to partner organisations. In this case, the International Rescue Committee's Geneva office manages the Surge Roster, which is designed to address the temporary UNHCR staffing needs in refugee protection in non-emergency situations¹¹. While Nucleus was not

¹¹ The 'Surge Project' aims to improve UNHCR's protection capacity. To this end, IRC hires, orients and deploys qualified protection staff with responsibilities in areas such as voluntary repatriation, local integration, physical protection in camps, returnee monitoring, registration

initially intended to function as a roster of specialists, its development builds on this tradition in the sense that rosters of cleared candidates are effectively being established for each occupational group and each job-grade combination within these groups.

OCHA's roster for the rapid recruitment of first responders encountered difficulties because its mechanisms were often bypassed.

Elsewhere within the UN system rosters have been developed for the rapid recruitment of first responders. For instance, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) established an Emergency Response Roster in June 2002. This aims for the rapid deployment of OCHA's own staff to sudden-onset disasters to assess the situation and establish initial coordination mechanisms. Staff serve on the roster for two months at a time and their brief is to be ready to deploy within 48 hours through a deployment methodology developed for the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams. While this roster system has been used in Iran, Uganda, Iraq and Liberia, its credibility has been undermined. Senior managers often bypass the roster mechanisms, staff are reluctant to subscribe to it (often as a result of a perceived lack of credibility), and there are recurrent problems with staff being released for deployment by their supervisors despite prior agreement.

In response to a similar need for rapid deployment in the start-up phase of DPKO peace operations, DPKO piloted a project to develop a conceptually similar Rapid Deployment Roster. The Roster was however beset with similar implementation issues as experienced by OCHA. The history of its implementation is briefly described below.

3.2.1 DPKO's Rapid Deployment Roster (RDR)

Purpose

The purpose of the Rapid Deployment Roster was to provide for experienced DPKO staff to be rapidly deployed for a period of up to three months to undertake critical tasks in the start-up phase of a mission, for mission enhancement or mission liquidation. It was established primarily to put key structures and functions in place quickly, allowing PMSS/DPKO the necessary lead time in which to recruit and deploy staff according to the regular procedures after the approval of posts and funding.

A brief history of implementation

In response to a recommendation of the Brahimi report to enhance rapid deployment capability (A/55/305-S/2000/809, para 91) DPKO initiated the establishment of a rapid deployment roster in 2003. On 14 February 2003, the decision was taken by the Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations

DPKO's Rapid Deployment Roster was to provide experienced staff for the start-up phase of missions.

and detention. Deployed staff report to and are supervised UNHCR officials. The Roster is considered a flexible and dependable staff deployment mechanism. For more information, see www.theIRC.org/surge.

Guéhenno to set up a dedicated RDR, on a pilot basis, for up to one year¹². This was to complement the use of the Strategic Deployment Stocks and enhance DPKO's ability to rapidly mount or expand a field operation.

The establishment of the roster

The rapid deployment roster was comprised of three 'teams' of 120 self-nominated professionals.

The RDR was to function in a staggered manner of 3 integrated teams of 120 personnel. Each team member would be able to deploy on 14 days readiness for four months of the year, and on 60-days notice for the remaining 8 months of the year. Preparations for the roster comprised three phases: a) initial clearance of candidates, b) technical and medical clearance and c) establishment of the three teams. Ultimately 290 staff were technically and medically cleared and placed on one of the three teams in the roster¹³. This fell short of the goal of 120 members of each team¹⁴. In the final selection, there were many functions that remained vacant, especially with senior posts above P5 and with specific functions such as DDR and Human Rights.

The use of the roster in the first year

In the first year it was used to provide 57 staff to 5 missions, most of whom were deployed in Liberia (UNMIL)

The roster was officially launched on 4 June 2003 and was put to immediate use with staff being deployed to the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire (5 staff). Thereafter it was used most intensively by the UN mission in Liberia, UNMIL (32 staff). In 2004 6 staff were deployed to the UN mission in Haiti, 6 staff to the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire and 1 staff member to the Iraq-Kuwait Observation mission for the liquidation of the mission. After one year a total of 57 staff members had been deployed to a total of six missions.

Evaluation

The RDR mechanism has been thoroughly evaluated. In late 2003 the Personnel Management and Support Service conducted a first evaluation which was later supplemented in 2004 in the context of a lessons learned study on the start-up phase of UNMIL conducted by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (May 2004). This resulted in a number of recommendations including *inter alia* draft revisions to the RDR procedures and recommendations to address gaps in the roster and the enforcement of the RDR mechanism, that were transmitted to the Office of Mission Support. The subsequent Report to the Secretary General of 31 March 2005 on the 'Status of the civilian rapid deployment roster' (A/59/763) drew on these earlier evaluations and recommendations and concluded with a programme of action

¹² Code cable 413 on the 'Establishment of Civilian Rapid Deployment Teams for Field Mission Start-Ups'

¹³ From 6500 applications, 637 were initially cleared, in so far as they were also approved by their immediate supervisor, CCPO and their CAO or Head of Mission by the deadline of 14 April 2003. Technical and medical clearance involved collaboration with technical focal points in several other departments and offices of DPKO. Selection criteria involved previous peacekeeping experience, gender and geographic balance, and language skills. Consideration was also given to spread the burden as much as possible across releasing missions and to minimise staff from Headquarters.

¹⁴ Team I had 113 personnel, team II 96 and team III 72.

Evaluation of the mechanism revealed, inter alia. that:

there was insufficient buy-in in releasing and receiving missions which undermined the credibility of the mechanism.

senior positions and certain functional areas were difficult to fill.

regarding the development of the mechanism. Some of the key issues identified and recommendations advanced related to:

- *Uncertain understanding of and/or commitment to the mechanism*

It was found that there was insufficient buy-in to the RDR mechanism. This resulted in instances where: releasing missions denied the release of selected staff members without explanation; some receiving missions refused staff members selected through the mechanism; and some receiving missions routinely requested extensions of RDR deployments beyond the 90 day maximum limit¹⁵. These deviations from the normal administrative arrangements weakened confidence in the roster process with the effect that missions became reluctant to release staff for fear that they might not return. In response, the 31 March 2005 Report (A/59/763) suggested the adoption of revised procedures on the RDR that would be communicated to all field missions, making clear that the RDR is not a transfer or promotion mechanism. The new procedures would nevertheless extend the period of deployment to 120 days with the requirement that roster staff return to their releasing mission for at least three months. Final decisions on whether to deploy a roster member were to be taken at headquarters.

- *Composition of the roster: Addressing functional gaps*

The experience of the first year of the roster demonstrated that some functions were more in demand than others and that a substantial number of critical posts were left either vacant or without a sufficient number of candidates to fully staff the three teams. In response to the RDR experience, a revised list of critical functions was drawn up and it was recommended that the RDR abandon the 3-team structure in favour of a single integrated roster of 365 civilian experts, whereby a number of experts would be identified for each of the critical start-up tasks. Moreover, to address the short-falls for senior positions and certain substantive areas where vacancies were difficult to fill, the application process was to be revised to include applications based on a nomination system (from Headquarters or the field mission) as well as self-motivated applications and the process was to be extended beyond DPKO to include other areas of the Secretariat and potentially UN Volunteers serving in peacekeeping operations. Beyond this it was recommended that the personnel pool be increased through linking up with other rapid deployment initiatives such as the development of Memoranda of Understanding with Member States to set up civilian stand-by capabilities.

The current situation: the RDR suspended

Despite the constructive report on the status of the civilian rapid deployment roster of 31 March 2005, the uncertain commitment to the mechanism led to a widespread lack of confidence in the system that resulted in its suspension as

¹⁵ For instance, UNMIL submitted nine requests for extension of staff out of a total of 32 staff. In other cases the receiving mission and the staff member concerned expressed an interest in remaining in the mission.

Uncertain commitment to the mechanism led to its suspension as a tool for rapid recruitment.

a tool for rapid recruitment. Members of the roster have not been asked to renew their candidature and DPKO is instead exploring alternative ways to ensure reliable access to a cadre of peacekeeping professionals that would be able to perform core mission start-up tasks at short-notice. Nevertheless, some of the recommendations developed in connection with the development of the RDR have been taken on board and are being applied to DPKO recruitment practices more generally. For instance, the RDR project has helped elaborate the core functions and associated job descriptions for mission-start up, and the substantive gaps encountered in the RDR are also common to DPKO recruitment needs more widely. Consequently, DPKO will continue to explore options to augment in-house expertise with experts from other UN agencies or external to the UN system (see options below).

3.3 Emerging Trends in DPKO Recruitment

3.3.1 Developing Career Peacekeepers

DPKO is currently exploring the development of a cadre of professional peacekeepers who could be deployed at short notice to perform critical functions.

The relatively unhappy history of the RDR to respond to DPKOs rapid deployment needs has arguably strengthened the case made by PMSS that DPKO needs to develop a core cadre of professional, career peacekeepers who can be called on at short-notice to perform critical functions in DPKO missions. PMSS is currently developing proposals to put to member states along these lines. The proposals appear to reverse the trend witnessed in the 1990s of offering only limited-duration 300 series contracts to an increasingly large number and range of experts. The lack of organisational commitment to developing and retaining such staff was based on the underlying political assumption that peacekeeping was not core, long-term UN business but rather responded to short-term ad-hoc and transitory needs. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, recently described the relatively poor conditions of DPKO service as follows¹⁶:

“DPKO is a hugely decentralized operation with many individuals in the field who bring commitment, experience and skill to UN peacekeeping. They risk their lives on a daily basis. These people, many of them civilian personnel, are peacekeeping professionals. Yet we have not provided them with a professional career structure or service. Civilian peacekeepers have not benefited from basic services such as security provision; training; standards and guidance; attractive conditions of service; mobility across the UN system; and opportunities for advancement.”

In response, personnel management plans that are being elaborated within PMSS seek to develop a core staff of between 1000 and 1500 that are qualified to perform a core sub-set of functions that are common to all

¹⁶ Speech to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, 20 October 2005.

This permanent staff would be complemented by international professionals on short-term contracts.

missions. Within this cadre, staff could develop their career paths within their respective, managerial, technical or political competencies and the terms and conditions of their employment would be conducive to long-term service within DPKO. Crucially, such staff would be offered long-term contracts, with provisions for family duty stations that would ultimately enable DPKO to draw upon a dependable and highly mobile pool of peacekeeping professionals. Such core staff would naturally be complemented by a broad range of international professionals on short-term contracts as is current practice. The development of career peacekeepers is therefore fully compatible with on-going efforts to expand the personnel pool from which DPKO can draw, *inter alia* though greater use of qualified experts external to the UN system.

3.3.2 Developing Stand-by Arrangements for the mobilization of external experts

The principal initiative to link up with other rosters was designed to complement normal recruitment practices with the provision of exceptional skills not available in or usually required by DPKO.

The principal DPKO initiative to link up with other national or external rosters followed the 2001 global civilian personnel strategy which called for an expansion in the sources of recruitment through *inter alia* the agreement of Memoranda of Understanding with UN agencies, agencies and Member States. To this end, in May 2004, DPKO sent a draft MoU to the Permanent Missions to the UN of 133 member states (Reference DPKO/OUSG/2004 04/155). The accompanying letter explained that the generic MoU ‘is intended to serve as a generic mechanism to foster greater collaboration between DPKO and member states interested in rapid deployment of individuals with very specialized skills not available within the Organisation’. The non-exclusive list of professional competences included civil aviation, fuel management, civil engineering and local community development. Experts deployed in accordance with this MoU could be employed as consultants, individual contractors or gratis personnel, on short-term (typically up to six months) contracts. They would not be considered UN staff and could not apply for UN posts for six months after the end of their service.

External experts identified by external rosters would not become UN staff.

Thus, this initiative did not target ‘core’ DPKO tasks or generate regular DPKO staff through replacing or supporting regular recruitment mechanisms. Nor was it aimed at addressing the recruitment challenges regarding rapid deployment for mission start-up or shortfalls in suitable candidates for certain areas of professional competence. Rather, it was intended to *complement* normal recruitment drives by delivering an alternative solution for the rapid deployment (within 30 days) of specialist expertise to *support* core mission posts and functions.

Member states were invited to indicate their interest in such collaboration and provide information on what kind of expertise could be made readily available for future DPKO missions. The communication of this initiative and its uptake was poor. Only three national roster managers – in Canada (CANADEM),

The uptake of this initiative was poor.

France (FCI) and Germany (ZIF) report having received the request and while they indicated their interest in such collaboration, no agreements have yet been signed. There are, perhaps, a number of reasons for this. The first is that the majority of member states still do not have any mechanisms – including rosters – in place for identifying specialist experts, either within government or operated outside of government in NGOs. The second is that the MoU only mentioned a few very specific and somewhat eclectic skill sets that many countries may have felt unable to provide, despite having rosters covering broad ranges of competences in other areas¹⁷. Thirdly, the generic MoU offers few incentives for such co-operation since it appears to exclude core or mainstream functions, effectively bars candidates from regular UN employment (at least for six months), and does not offer any compensation for recruitment services offered. The generic MoU therefore falls short of its potential to tap the recruitment resources of member states that have developed rosters for a wider range of expertise (and can presumably afford to use them for the UN’s benefit) and offers little in the way of incentives to generate this recruitment capacity in member states that do not already have it.

The initiative fell short of its potential to tap the talent in external rosters for regular DPKO positions.

As such, the current stand-by roster initiative falls short of DPKO’s ambition to draw on the widest possible range of talent through, *inter alia*, developing MoUs with member states and agencies. Better linkage with other UN agencies and external roster managers could help DPKO identify suitable candidates for regular or advertised DPKO positions or serve as a back-up mechanism for identifying specialists where normal recruitment procedures have failed to do so. The following section describes some of the most salient qualities of a number of external rosters that might serve as a source of personnel for DPKO.

4. External Rosters

In response to increased quantitative and qualitative demand for civilian capabilities for peace operations, parallel initiatives to raise and deploy civilian expert personnel for peace operations have been launched in a variety of fora. This section provides an overview of new and existing initiatives and services designed to facilitate the identification and recruitment of specialist civilian personnel for peace operations. It includes an overview of mechanisms deployed by other regional organisations, notably the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU), and reviews existing and new national initiatives (in Canada, Germany, France, Norway, United Kingdom, the United States and Switzerland), as well as a few international non-governmental initiatives.

¹⁷ This was likely the case in Norway, where the government did not forward the MoU to Nordem, the organisation that maintains the national election observation and peacebuilding roster.

This study is not exhaustive but seeks to highlight some of the parallel international and national initiatives to raise civilian personnel for international deployments.

The study is by no means exhaustive. Clearly there are other relevant organisations that are active in this area. At the regional level, for example, the African Union also has plans to develop a stand-by roster of civilian experts. At the national level, a number of other nation states have a broad range of civilian experts to draw on and have developed recruitment mechanisms within their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to harness these resources. Sweden, Denmark, and New Zealand are but a few cases in point. In contrast, Australia has sub-contracted out recruitment for funded deployments to Red R Australia. In the non-governmental sector, a number of organisations provide services in civilian post-conflict reconstruction. These include development and peace-building organisations that conduct needs assessments, and/or provide advice, training and other forms of technical assistance in security sector reform, including the reform of penal institutions (e.g. ILAC) or the development of extended or community based policing e.g. Saferworld. Similarly, a number of commercial agencies such as Adam Smith International and Crown Agents also provide recruitment and/or direct post-conflict reconstruction services. Although some countries such as the UK and US use these services for the identification and recruitment of civilian experts, a description of the broad range of commercial actors involved in post conflict reconstruction is beyond the scope of this study.

4.1 Civilian recruitment in Regional Organisations

Unlike the UN, the OSCE and EU rely primarily on seconded personnel.

The UN differs from the OSCE and EU in so far as it only considers direct applications and does not generally accept gratis personnel. In contrast, the OSCE and EU rely principally on seconded personnel and the focus of civilian recruitment capacity development in the past decade has consequently been the development of sufficiently rapid and efficient mechanisms by which to inform member states of recruitment needs and co-ordinate multinational responses. This section includes a brief overview of the different recruitment mechanisms developed within the OSCE and EU. For comparative purposes, information is also provided in tabular form in Annex 2.

4.1.1 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

While the original intention was to develop a centralized REACT roster in the OSCE, participating states wanted to retain control over personnel they proposed for secondment.

In the OSCE the original intention was to develop a centralised database, maintained by the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, of national experts that could be offered for secondment and deployed within the Rapid Expert Assistance Co-operation Teams (REACT) system. However, at the development stage, it became apparent that not all participating states shared the vision that was proposed at the 1999 Istanbul Summit. Rather, they wanted to retain ultimate control over personnel they proposed for secondment to OSCE field activities, while adopting a variety of individual approaches to how, when and where and under what circumstances they would provide candidate information to the Secretariat. Thus, the OSCE has no centralised repository of information

for professional mission positions¹⁸, but rather issues vacancy notices to which its 55 participating states are obliged to respond rapidly – possibly within a matter of days.

The OSCE receives manageable number of nominations per vacancy

In addition, it was agreed that REACT should be ‘embedded’ within the overall system for recruiting and selecting seconded staff for the normal day-to-day field activities. Currently the OSCE receives anywhere between four to 30 nominations by participating states per vacancy. This is a very manageable number. There is room for the number to grow as member states improve their internal roster and candidate selection mechanisms, but even if each member state were to submit two candidates for a position, the Secretariat could manage the selection process in a timely manner.

And the selection of candidates is conducted jointly by the Head of Mission and the Secretariat.

The selection of candidates is conducted jointly between screening staff in the recruitment section of the Secretariat and the Head of Mission or their nominated representative. There are currently 6 staff in the recruitment section dealing with seconded staff that are permanently engaged in screening candidates, and this core staff can be reinforced in times of rapid deployment, as for example when the OSCE deployed over 100 police officers to Skopje in approximately two weeks. As in the UN system, screening is a two-stage process. Initial screening, undertaken by screening staff in the recruitment section, relates to whether the candidate meets the minimum requirements. Thereafter, applications are processed by experts who make one of three judgments on each application received, namely recommended, worthy of consideration, or not recommended. The head of mission receives all the application forms along with the expert judgments of those recommended or worthy of consideration and, in co-operation with the Secretariat in Vienna, makes the final selection. In start-up missions this is often done in Vienna before the mission has been launched working directly with recruitment staff in the Secretariat.

On average, 60% of nominations meet the requirements of the vacancy

Of the overall nominations received by participating states in 2004 on average 60% met the requirements outlined in the vacancy notice. However, as the work in some missions becomes more technical and requires secondees with very specialist expertise, the percentage of nominations meeting the requirements in certain fields of expertise sometimes declines. For example, the changing needs and evolving requirements in relation to OSCE police missions necessitated the provision of high-calibre police secondees, but overall the percentage of nominations found to meet these requirements dropped to 30% in 2004. This reflected not only that police with relevant expertise were in more limited supply but also highlighted the importance of fully briefing participating states on changing needs and requirements.

¹⁸ In addition to seconded staff, the OSCE also employs contracted staff directly to fill administrative and support positions. These candidates apply as individuals against Vacancy Notices posted on the OSCE web site and are selected and interviewed in Vienna.

The quality and range of candidates nominated by participating states has increased over time and the OSCE has indirectly helped to professionalise nomination practices.

Despite occasionally high rates of unsuitable nominations for specific functions, on the whole the nomination system functions well as a feeder mechanism for generating a manageable short-list of geographically diverse candidates. This is principally because the OSCE retains control over the final selection of candidates on the basis of merit. It militates against participating states nominating candidates on the basis of political patronage and provides a market-driven incentive for member states to improve the quality and suitability of their candidates. The OSCE has therefore quietly helped to professionalise nomination practices in a number of its participating states through these indirect incentives for reform, but has also actively supported these reforms through education and outreach with its national recruitment partners. Rather than spending its recruitment resources on processing direct applications (as DPKO does) it spends a smaller amount on the selection of candidates from a short-list, and on improving capacity in the participating states that feed candidates into the OSCE. This approach has met with success in so far as the number and quality of nominations for OSCE positions have steadily increased. Moreover, in the functional areas where there were identified shortfalls in quality, these have been targeted in co-operation with participating states and the number and quality of applications has improved as a result.

To facilitate rapid response from participating states, the OSCE has adopted a simple matrix of fields and levels of expertise.

Another key element of the improved quantitative, qualitative and *rapid* response by participating states to vacancy announcements over the past five years is the development of a relatively simple matrix of fields of expertise and levels of professional competence that helps participating states classify their candidates and respond quickly to vacancy announcements. The matrix is based on a grid of 12 fields of expertise (administration and support, civilian police, democratisation, economic and environmental affairs, education, elections, general staff/monitoring functions, human rights, media affairs, military affairs, political affairs, and rule of law) and four levels of professional competence (senior management, senior professional, middle management and professional). Additional mission-specific recruitment requirements typically include a high level of professional expertise, a specific language knowledge or relevant geographical experience. While the level of detail and complexity of member states national databases varies, all have been able to integrate this simple format into their classification of candidates, typically by requiring potential candidates to fill in the appropriate boxes in their on-line OSCE application form, so that they can quickly screen vacancy notices against their candidates¹⁹.

¹⁹ Of the 55 OSCE participating states, 10 now allow for on-line applications through their national web-sites, 31 are receiving applications via the OSCE web site by fax or by e-mail to their national contact points and two give telephone contact details to their nationals. Of the remaining 12 who currently do not operate in a soft-copy environment, 10 have a limited history of seconding personnel to the OSCE.

This strategy is not easily transferable to the UN context, in which staff are directly recruited and employed. It nevertheless demonstrates that outsourcing of pre-selection to nation states need not compromise the quality of selected personnel.

One of the characteristics of the OSCE recruitment matrix is that it is simple and transparent so as to maximise the number of nominations received from participating states. This strategy is entirely appropriate for a context which relies on seconded staff and in which there are not typically too many applications to process for each vacancy position. This is not the case for DPKO positions, however, which receive more applications through Galaxy than can be processed in a timely manner. However, if DPKO is serious about expanding its sources of recruitment through the development of MoUs with member states and other relevant agencies that maintain rosters of pre-screened experts, the OSCE experience would suggest that it is important that partners understand and can easily act upon the recruitment needs of DPKO. This might require the further explanation of the job descriptions within DPKO's 24 occupational groups and 12 levels or grades and some illustration of equivalence with those of other organisations, including the OSCE. The procedures developed within the Memoranda of Understanding should also be straight forward and ideally compatible with other international procedures for nominating personnel.

4.1.2 The European Union

Within the European Union (EU) the recruitment mechanisms for civilian experts vary according to whether they are deployed to inter-governmental crisis management missions managed by the Council of the European Union or to support activities managed by the European Commission.

So-called 'civilian crisis management missions' are conducted within the intergovernmental framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whereby member states unanimously agree to undertake a mission, and voluntarily undertake to second personnel to it. While the EU is new to the business of deploying civilians for peace operations (it became operational in 2003 with the launch of the first civilian operation -- the EU's Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina), institutional recruitment capacity has been developed relatively quickly to meet the ever-increasing demand in terms of number and scope of operations²⁰. EU civilian missions are planned and managed by the Directorate General IX (DGE IX) within the Council Secretariat, with approximately 40 staff. The mission support section of DGE IX is also responsible for elaborating generic job descriptions, elaborating selection procedures, establishing Codes of Conduct, determining mission personnel requirements and supporting the Head of Mission in selecting personnel by conducting initial screening. To date, over 100 generic job descriptions have been developed in the priority areas of civilian police, rule of law, civilian administration, monitoring and mission support. Personnel requirements are divided into three levels: strategic (for candidates with over 15 years relevant experience); upper and middle management (for candidates

²⁰ To date, there have been 12 EU civilian operations and 4 military operations in the framework of ESDP.

EU 'civilian crisis management missions' mainly include personnel seconded from member states.

with 10-15 years experience); and technical (for specialists with over 8 years experience).

The range of expertise required has increased over time

To date the majority of EU civilian missions have worked to build state capacity in the priority areas of police and rule of law. The scope of EU missions has, however, recently increased to include monitoring, security sector reform and DDR functions. Indeed the on-going EU missions in Aceh Indonesia, the Rafah border crossing, the Moldovan-Ukrainian border and the Democratic Republic of Congo all focus on building capacity and confidence in these areas. The range of expertise that missions require has increased accordingly. Other innovations, notably the decision to establish Civilian Response Teams comprised of a range of experts and designed to perform needs assessments in preparation for ESDP missions or to provide surge capacity for on-going missions, also require that member states establish appropriate mechanisms to identify and rapidly deploy suitable personnel. Thus the ESDP system relies largely on member states having sufficient capacity and mechanisms in place at the national level to meet recruitment needs. While this has spurred activity at a national level to develop rosters, the expertise of personnel provided by member states still varies widely, and women are consistently under-represented in the nominations of member states.

And the modalities of deployment have become more flexible, and include plans to establish Civilian Response Teams to conduct needs assessments and/or provide surge capacity.

Procedures for recruiting seconded staff

The Council Secretariat does not maintain a centralized roster of national personnel. Rather it identifies the essential personnel requirements for individual missions (number of personnel and job descriptions) and member states are encouraged to nominate national experts for these positions in these missions in response to a mission-specific 'calls for contributions'. The number of candidates nominated by a member state is often larger than the number of positions the member state is willing to second (and pay for) and the EU Head of Mission ultimately decides which (if any) of the national nominations are selected. The Head of Mission is supported in the recruitment process by DGE IX, which performs initial screening of applications to determine eligibility. Short-listed candidates are then invited to Brussels for an interview and testing (for small mission of up to 30 posts). For larger missions, candidates for key posts are invited for interview, while others are interviewed by phone. The Head of Mission usually participates in the interview process.

The Head of Mission is responsible for selecting seconded staff, supported by the Secretariat.

Procedures for recruiting contracted international and local staff

The EU also directly employs international staff, funded from the CFSP budget, for core positions including in the areas of administrative and financial control, logistics, procurement, Communication and Information Systems and, on occasion, security. In addition, local professional staff are employed for a number of support functions, including in the areas mentioned above. Standard selection procedures have been established but numbers and

The EU recruits directly for core administrative positions.

timelines vary from mission to mission. Since the Head of Mission is responsible for recruitment strategy, advertising also varies from mission to mission. This has led to charges that the EU is not sufficiently transparent. To improve transparency and address specific personnel shortfalls, notably for senior administration positions and communication information system specialists, DGE IX is likely to consider direct applications for contracted positions, in response to vacancy announcements on its web-site, as well as the establishment of a roster of candidates for contracted EU positions.

European Commission arrangements

The other EU institutional actor in crisis response is the European Commission. From the early 1990s it supported post conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and rehabilitation activities in the Balkans in particular. Although EC projects are generally implemented by partners including the UN family of agencies and NGOs, the EC has developed means of identifying and recruiting civilian experts to support programme design, evaluation and project implementation across a broad range of post-conflict and peacebuilding functional areas. It has, for example, concluded framework agreements with private sector agencies that are contracted to provide experts at short notice in the area of emergency assistance and relief, security governance, democratisation, rehabilitation and reconstruction. The Commission makes the final selection between the candidates nominated. The framework agreement mechanisms are not however intended for large-scale deployments of personnel. Where greater numbers are required, as in the EC election observation missions, the Commission manages recruitment in co-operation with member states, whereby member states are responsible for screening their national candidates before they are placed on the EU Election Observation Roster which includes 2200 members. In addition the EC also calls on seconded experts from EU member states for short term actions (usually around 2 weeks) to provide technical assistance, including in the areas of human rights, freedom, security and justice, in the Western Balkans and EU Candidate and Neighbourhood countries. This Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) programme mobilises over 6000 experts a year deployed in over 1000 technical assistance actions, including peer assessment missions and training events.

EC projects are usually implemented by partners, but the EC also deploys over 6000 seconded experts a year in short term technical assistance actions (TAIEX), 1000 election observers from the EU Election Observation Roster and a number of experts employed as consultants and recruited through private sector agencies.

The mix of mechanisms that the EU employs to identify and mobilise civilian expertise is potentially interesting for DPKO. Mechanisms developed within the Commission point to the utility of outsourcing the identification of specialist or niche experts for short-term deployments. This might be a useful model for addressing shortfalls in particular competence areas. More generally, the development of EU civilian actions in police, rule of law and security sector reform, point to the fact that EU member states are increasingly required to develop mechanisms at the national level for the rapid identification of experts in precisely those areas that DPKO also requires personnel and often struggles to find sufficient number and quality of

The areas in which the EU is developing civilian capabilities overlap with DPKO needs.

A mixed solution to recruitment, with different procedures for different needs, is appropriate for the EU and might also be useful for DPKO.

candidates. This suggests that efforts to develop Memoranda of Understanding with member states and other relevant agencies (or with the EU on their behalf) should help DPKO increase the sources of its recruitment and address shortfalls without incurring significant additional financial costs or overburdening DPKO's recruitment officers with a large volume of candidates. Moreover, the EU example also attests to the fact that a mixed solution to recruitment is possible and in some cases appropriate. It might, for example, be appropriate to outsource the recruitment of certain specialist experts that are in short supply and difficult to find, while developing strategies to share access to talent that is already pre-selected in other national rosters and rapidly deployable. Similarly, it might be appropriate to establish and maintain rosters of a limited size and scope for core administrative functions, while relying on national feeder mechanisms for the majority of deployable professional experts. The following section provides more detail on some of the existing national roster mechanisms that might be usefully tapped to this end.

4.2 Civilian rosters at the national level

A number of national rosters were established in the 1990s and have increased their scope since then.

In response to the increasing demand for a wider range of civilian expertise for international peace operations many countries now maintain databases or rosters of personnel. Where these were established in the mid-1990s, e.g. Nordem in Norway, they were initially intended to service human rights, democratization and civilian administration and later added competences with an obvious security dimension such as rule of law, SSR or DDR. Rosters that were established more recently tend to have a broader scope, reflecting the increased range of civilian expertise required for peacebuilding and post conflict reconstruction. In establishing these rosters, roster managers have often drawn on existing data held within different government departments, as for instance in Canada, Germany and the UK.

This section highlights the experience of some seven countries that have established or are in the process of developing rosters of civilian experts that broadly have the range of competences that DPKO is also interested in. Detailed information on these rosters is provided in tabular form in Annex 5 for purposes of comparison.

The national rosters reviewed here are not necessarily typical since, while often funded by government, they are often not under direct government control and include experts from the private and NGO sectors.

It is important to note, however, that this selection of national rosters is not necessarily representative of the situation in many other countries. Some of the rosters reviewed here are operated by independent organisations, even if they are funded by national governments (e.g. Canada, Norway, Germany) or operate with a large degree of independence while being embedded within government departments (e.g. the UK and Switzerland). This has implications for how they select and perceived to select candidates and helps to ensure that candidates are selected on their merits. In many countries there is no such independence and there is a constant temptation for government-controlled rosters to quietly advance their preferred candidates (sometimes the most

dispensable) rather than the most qualified. Even where this does not happen, there is the perception that rosters within government are advancing the politically preferred.

To draw on the widest range of expertise, it is important that DPKO link up with those rosters that are managed independently and are not exclusive.

Moreover, many of the national rosters reviewed include civil servants as well as experts from the private sector e.g. lawyers, engineers and media, and experts from the non-governmental sector, often with expertise in areas such as democratisation, election observation, human rights, gender, and reconciliation. This is also atypical of many government-controlled databases that are usually limited to its civil servants. Thus, many government-controlled rosters are often limited in their size, and exclude experts that have international non-governmental experience or experience working in international organisations. To draw upon the widest range of suitable potential candidates, it is therefore important that DPKO not limit its links with external rosters to those directly operated by member states. Indeed, it may be important for the UN to lend its support to initiatives to create national or regional rosters within the non-governmental sector. In any case, the utility of external rosters to DPKO will depend on the scope and quality of their roster populations and the procedures they have in place for pre-screening and selecting suitable candidates.

4.2.1 Canada

CANADEM maintains the largest national roster (7500 members) with a broad scope of expertise.

CANADEM, ‘Canada’s Civilian Reserve’, was established as a non-profit organization in 1997 with funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to respond to staffing requests from international peace operations. With a grant of some \$500,000 a year, CANADEM has established and maintains a Civilian Reserve Roster and is responsible for the recruitment, screening, promotion and rapid mobilization of Canadian expertise²¹. Of the national rosters reviewed, CANADEM is the largest with over 7500 members. The scope of expertise is also broad. It is broken down into 10 substantive categories: human rights, peacebuilding, rule of law, governance, democratization, elections, policing, security, admin-logistics and reconstruction. These are in turn divided into a large number of sub-categories. For example, a specialist in prisons or corrections would be filed under governance/peace and security/human security/security sector and institutions. In addition, the roster includes 29 categories in a general skills inventory which documents various aspects of past work experience and skills acquired. The CANADEM database has therefore been designed for detailed searches based on a broad range of skills or substantive expertise. Indeed, the range of substantive specialisations is greater than those currently required by DPKO. While CANADEM’s classification system does not correspond to that of DPKO’s Nucleus database, the absence of standardization is not necessarily

²¹ CANADEM identifies a short-list of potential candidates in response to both requests for national government-paid secondments i.e. to the OSCE or direct applications, paid by the international organisation or NGO.

problematic. This is because CANADEM also conducts position screening, whereby CANADEM staff match position criteria to the skills and experience of those in the Roster²². CANADEM is one of the three agencies that is currently discussing the development of a Memorandum of Understanding with DPKO.

CANADEM is the most effective roster mechanism in terms of the uptake of its members by DPKO, although there are no formal ways of tracking the success of its referrals.

Its success is attributable to its large and diverse roster population, its pro-active approach to responding to DPKO needs, and its competitive and rapid screening techniques.

DPKO recruitment officers attest to the relatively high numbers of Canadian civilians employed in DPKO missions. Indeed it was noted that where there are already a large number of Canadians in a mission, candidates of other nationalities are often favoured on grounds of geographical balance. One recent example of the success of Canadian candidates was the fact that 18 out of 35 positions created to provide a surge of capacity in the Department for Safety and Security (DSS) were filled by Canadians. The rapid-response and UN-focused mechanisms developed by CANADEM helped achieve this result in so far as CANADEM contacted suitable members of its roster to apply in response to the appropriate vacancy announcements in Galaxy. Thus, while, the Galaxy and Nucleus systems are blind to whether a candidate is a member of any external roster, including CANADEM²³, there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that many Canadian candidates are successful because of the suitability of the CANADEM model to the UN's needs. Specifically, CANADEM's attentiveness to UN vacancy announcements and 'just in time' position screening procedures mean that it can respond rapidly and is adept at matching UN job descriptions and grades with profiles in its roster. CANADEM is however unusual in so far as it is one of the few national rosters that includes and is funded to pro-actively service international organizations, notably the UN, as one of its core mission tasks. Most other roster managers place less emphasis on monitoring and responding to UN vacancy announcements and are consequently relatively less successful in getting their roster members placed. This suggests that the existence of national rosters alone is not sufficient to improve the number and suitability of national candidates applying for DPKO positions and highlights the value of additional services that help tailor roster mechanisms to UN needs. One of the broader challenges for the UN is how to ensure that more national rosters are developed in a way that is sensitive and responsive to UN needs. In addition, DPKO also needs to reflect on how it might better communicate its needs with national roster managers so that they are able to quickly match these with the appropriate categories and profiles within their national databases.

²² Moreover, CANADEM also provides a free rostering service to NGOs and other organisations in Canada, thereby obviating the need to create competing rosters and consolidating its position as a single, common national recruitment asset.

²³ However, in order to keep track of referrals, PMSS and CANADEM are discussing the possibility that CANADEM's members acknowledge their membership in their applications to Galaxy.

4.2.2 France

France Coopération Internationale (FCI) was established in 2002 to promote French expertise in cooperation and development with core support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It identifies and recruits experts, drawing on a list of some 1000 CVs and its network of contact points in human resources departments across the administration, in the following fields of expertise: Administrative reform; public finance auditing; decentralized institutional cooperation; anti money laundering town planning and post crisis reconstruction; evaluation of training and education systems, pandemic medical expertise, customs and police cooperation; pollution and environmental protection and disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation. FCI often functions as an implementing partner, carrying out projects for the General Directorate for Development and Co-operation or international organizations including the European Commission, UNDP and UNICEF. It also provides a free service to international organizations for the identification and selection of individual experts or French consultants. In 2004 it put forward a hundred or so names in response to direct requests for individual experts or expert teams. This service has most extensively been taken up by the World Bank, but could also, in principle, be taken up by DPKO. DPKO and FCI have begun to discuss the agreement of a Memorandum of Understanding along these lines.

FCI identifies and recruits French experts through a network of contact points in the administration rather than a roster mechanism.

4.2.3 Germany

The **Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF)** was founded in 2002 with core support of the Federal Foreign Office. Previously, the Federal Foreign Office had operated several rosters for civilian personnel in peace and election observation missions. ZIF took over the roster management function and merged these separate rosters into a single personnel pool. This currently includes over 900 German nationals with expertise in 16 categories. These include: democratization, elections, human rights, rule of law, public administration, media development, public information, political affairs, legal affairs, mission administration and support, infrastructure and economic affairs, monitoring, DDR, humanitarian affairs, refugees, and reconciliation. Members of the roster must either have completed the basic training course or have equivalent training and experience. Candidates are also interviewed and evaluated during the basic training course and it therefore also serves as part of the screening process. There are 71 civilians from the pool employed in current UN-led peace operations (excluding 274 civilian police, most of whom are deployed in UNMIK). While members of the roster are encouraged to apply directly to DPKO, ZIF has no means of tracking these applications. Like CANADEM and FCI, ZIF also received the draft Memorandum of Understanding regarding the establishment of an international roster of civilian experts and responded with interest.

ZIF has over 900 members covering a broad scope of expertise. Members typically receive induction training and the majority of deployments are funded by the government.

The ZIF model emphasizes training and pre-screening for all members of the roster so as to maintain a pool of trusted, reliable personnel. It is not designed to maximize success in competitions for international contracted positions.

The ZIF model, like the NORDEM model (below), emphasizes the training of roster members. Participation in a 2-week induction course is normally a prerequisite for roster membership and forms part of the selection process. This helps ensure that the quality of all roster members is good and that those with limited field experience are aware of what potential placements involve, but it is expensive and therefore is most suitable for well-funded and relatively small rosters. Moreover, since field experience is generally considered more important than formal training, the fact that roster members have participated in these induction courses is will not necessarily improve their chances of success in recruitment competitions. This is not therefore a model that would be easily transferable to or affordable in developing countries with more limited resources. Nevertheless, there is clearly a need to offer pre-deployment organization and mission-specific training to successful candidates as part of the preparation of personnel. The UN also offers some briefing and training programmes and might in future be able to join forces with relevant national training institutes, including ZIF, for the training of successful candidates.

4.2.4 Norway

NORDEM has a similar model of pre-selection and training to that of ZIF and maintains a roster of 350 experts that are called on for seconded deployments, many of which are in election observation missions.

The **Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)** was perhaps the first national roster established for the identification of civilian experts for international peace operations. It was established in 1993 and currently includes 350 experts in its resource database. Of these over 150 are also included in the rapidly deployable ‘stand by force’, and are ready to take on assignments of up to six months at short notice. The stand by force covers the following categories: election observers, technical election support, election experts, political analysis, local governance, free media, good governance, legal reform, human rights monitors and investigators of gross violations of human rights. Recruitment takes place annually through advertisements in national and regional newspapers and selection involves paper screening and interviews. All newly recruited members are required to attend the 6-day Nordem basic training course. In 2004, Nordem arranged for 96 experts to be seconded by the Foreign Ministry to international missions. Of these over half were for election observation missions and only 6 were seconded UN led missions, four of whom to DPKO in UNMIK, Kosovo. The number of Nordem roster members that are currently seconded to UN missions has decreased substantially since 1999 when the ‘no gratis personnel’ rule was introduced. Prior to this, between 1996 and 1998, Nordem had an agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), which provided for UNHCHR to request individuals or teams of experts to be identified and deployed either in a particular contract (seconded) or under the terms of a Special Service Agreement (SSA). While only a few members of the roster are still seconded to DPKO, Nordem encourages direct applications for DPKO positions but has no means of tracking their success.

In addition to the NORDEM roster, the Ministry of Justice established a roster of rule of law experts in 2003.

More recently, in late 2003, a **Crisis Response Pool** was established in the Ministry of Justice to help identify and mobilize rule of law experts for international missions. The pool currently comprises 30 experts including judges, public prosecutors, police lawyers and prison service managers. This is set to rise to 40 in 2006. Currently over 20 experts are deployed on bilateral and EU missions in Sarajevo, Georgia and Afghanistan. None have, as of yet, been deployed in UN missions.

The NORDEM model is similar to the ZIF model in so far as the roster is limited in size and includes participation in a training course as a pre-requisite for roster membership. It has not, however, a one-stop-shop for all Norwegian civilian expertise. While Nordem includes experts with rule of law expertise, the Norwegian Crisis Response Pool was set up within the Ministry of Justice to augment this with more specialized experts, especially in the field of corrections. Indeed it is often the case at national level that databases of experts are maintained in different ministries and/or NGOs. This presents a potential challenge for DPKO's efforts to link with national roster managers, given that the total number of relevant contact points/roster managers is likely to be numerous and therefore difficult to manage. One way to reduce the resultant complexity is to insist on a single, central contact point for requesting expert assistance. This need not necessarily or even ideally be located within the government, and would encourage the development of internal mechanisms for co-ordinating disparate rosters as well as provide incentives for the eventual consolidation of rosters within a particular territory.

4.2.5 United Kingdom

The PCRU is an interdepartmental Unit that aims to deploy some 350 to 400 (funded) civilian experts to international or bilateral missions a year.

The Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) is an interdepartmental unit mandated to improve the United Kingdom's capacity for immediate post conflict stabilization. PCRU aims to be able to deploy some 350 to 400 civilian experts, about 200 of whom would be police, arranged by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). To reach this target it has included some 400 vetted experts, excluding police, in its roster. The professional scope of deployable civilian experts is divided into 122 skill sets within the following categories: economic; governance; infrastructure; logistics; management and support; public services; health; and security and justice. To achieve operational capacity quickly, PCRU contracted out the function of database management to the Department for International Development's (DFID's) Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department Operations Team (CHAD OT) as part of their current Crown Agents/Humanitarian Services Contract. Under this contract CHAD OT supplied three staff to develop the widest possible range of vetted expertise. The vetting and selection of experts for the roster is therefore outsourced.

The PCRU roster has been developed using an 'explore and exploit' approach to using data from other government departments and external bodies.

It plans to forge further links with other national roster managers.

PCRU has partially outsourced the management of its roster and maintains control over its scope and growth strategy as well as the final selection of candidates.

In developing the roster PCRU focused on establishing linkages with existing assets, both within government departments and external organizations and pursued an 'explore and exploit' approach with other government departments and external bodies. Specifically, the roster drew on the database managed by CHAD OT and contracted by Crown Agents, which in turn drew on the database managed by the NGO RedR-IHE (see below), and the FCO's database of police, which was developed to serve the OSCE and other international bodies. It is also exploring access to pools of security and justice specialists held by the Home Office and establishing links with the Crown Prosecution Service, the Law Society and the Bar Service. PCRU also sought to widen its sources of expertise internationally. The International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP), which pools expertise from the UK, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, is considered one such useful source of international expertise. The IHP already pools contracted experts to work for each IHP member and collectively for the UN²⁴. PCRU also plans to explore forging links for more reciprocal access with like-minded partners such as the Americans, Australians, Canadians, Germans and Swiss and plans to explore how it might better link with the EU and UN for the training of experts on the roster.

As noted in the introduction to this paper, the PCRU experience is interesting in that it demonstrates how rosters can be developed cost-efficiently by sharing personnel information (rather than through direct applications). It is also interesting in so far as PCRU has sought to control costs through outsourcing certain roster management functions (currently performed by Crown Agents) while still maintaining direct control over the scope and size of the roster, the strategy for its development, and its use for the identification of candidates. This is another model that combines cost control with political control, but the question of where the proper balance between the two should lie remains an open one. Some would argue that it is more efficient to outsource all but the final selection of candidates from a short-list, since this minimizes cost without compromising political control. Moreover, in the case of the UK where the largest and most established roster of civilian expertise is maintained by an NGO (RedR - IHE), it is questionable as to why the consolidation of rosters is still only partial and whether the management of recruitment could not be more efficiently performed by outsourcing more roster management tasks to established, independent roster managers. Doing so would also set a positive example for other countries that are considering or in the process of establishing rosters, signalling that these functions need not be embedded within government. Indeed it may be more desirable in terms of cost efficiency and the quality of service product -- the identification of the most suitable civilian experts from the widest possible range of sources -- for these tasks to be conducted by specialist independent organizations.

²⁴ For example, the IHP provided the logistics requirements for the international civilian intervention in East Timor and support for the UN HQs in Larnaka, Iraq and Darfur.

The roster is divided into three tiers, whereby the first is a high readiness category of trusted experts that also receive hostile environment training.

The PCRU roster is divided into three tiers, whereby tier one is a high-readiness category of consultants with tried and tested members who would deploy early and contribute to PCRU planning. PCRU staff would form a nucleus of teams selected from tier 1. Tier 2 would include less well-known individuals with proven experience. Both Tier 1 and Tier 2 category experts would be invited to undertake hostile environment training provided by the contractor Crown Agents/CHAD OT. Tier 3 experts would have experience more compatible with steady state missions, with the potential of migrating to Tier 1 over time.

4.2.6 United States

The US is developing three mechanisms for the future deployment of civilian personnel:

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (**S/CRS**) of the US Department of State (DOS), established in August 2004, is currently overseeing the development of the following mechanisms for the identification, recruitment and deployment of civilian personnel for reconstruction and stabilization activities:

A pre-selected, trained corps of foreign and civil service employees that would serve as first responders (plans for 200 by 2007).

The Active Response Corps is a roster of pre-selected and specially trained ‘first responders’. It consists of serving state department civil service and foreign service employees. They must be available for deployment anywhere in the world within one week for missions of up to six months. Staff are employed by the corps (S/CRS) for up to 2 years and carry out this duty as their primary job. They agree in advance to deploy anywhere in the world. When not in the field, they are employed in one of the bureaus of the state department supporting on-going reconstruction efforts. There are currently 8 members of the corps and plans for this to grow to 100. Recruitment for the corps is managed by S/CRS. A standby Response Corps is also being established with additional State Department staff to supplement the Active Response Corps. Recruitment targets are 100 in 2006 and 200 in 2007. Equivalent rosters in other US government agencies are also to be established and/or strengthened.

A civilian reserve of some 3000 local government employees by 2009, contingent on the approval of funding and enabling legislation.

A Civilian Reserve – a planned source of ‘second responders’. Plans for a reserve of civilian experts are subject to the outcome of an extensive feasibility study on the proposal and the agreement of enabling legislation that would *inter alia* guarantee reemployment rights to reservists. The proposed reserve would aim to include some 3000 civil servants from state and local government with expertise in policing, civil engineering, civil administration and rule of law by 2009. The 2007 target is for 600 police and police trainers and 50 rule of law experts. Reservists would remain in their current employment but would commit to: being a member of the reserve for three years; being deployed at 30 to 90 days notice for up to one year; and participating in a 2 week training course every year. When deployed they would be paid a US government equivalent salary. Should it be agreed, the

maintenance of the civilian reserve roster, vetting and recruitment of candidates would be outsourced to a contractor. For 2007, the DOS has requested \$25 million to create an initial civilian reserve.

A database 'roster' of private contractors and individuals providing post conflict reconstruction services.

Global Skills Network. This is a database of current contractors providing post conflict reconstruction services that S/CRS plans to develop and maintain. This includes commercial companies, non-governmental organisations and individual expert consultants. The database should help the rapid mobilisation of contracted services since this would be achieved on the basis of revising existing contracts rather than launching new tenders.

The US case is interesting in so far as it has great potential. There are undoubtedly a large number of US civilian experts that would be suitable candidates for working in post-conflict settings and plans are now well advanced to develop a variety of mechanisms, tailored to both government and private/NGO sector contexts, so as to identify and harness these resources more effectively. Nevertheless the implementation of these mechanisms is still at an early stage, and it is therefore likely to take a couple of years before the US is in a position to service its own needs for deployable civilian experts, let alone those of other international organizations. One advantage for DPKO is that these mechanisms are being developed in a single office (S-CRS), which should, in time, be able to respond to requests from DPKO for candidates with specific expertise, by drawing on these various mechanisms and rosters.

While the US case has great potential, it is at an early stage of development.

4.2.7 Switzerland

SEP maintains a roster of 500 experts with a broad range of expertise. Long and short term deployments are typically funded, but SEP also selects candidates for contracted positions.

The **Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP)** was established in 2001 within the Political Affairs Division (IV) of the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs²⁵. The expert pool is based on the Swiss militia principle, whereby its members are in regular employment and receive salaries from the Federal government for the duration of their deployment. Members of the pool normally participate in a two-week peacebuilding induction course. The SEP currently includes over 500 experts in the following categories: democratization, rule of law (including legal and corrections experts and police), protection of minorities, human rights monitoring, election observation, support for civil administration, gender issues, civilian police monitoring, customs and finance, and forensic pathology. In response to requests by international organizations, suitable members of the pool are selected and presented as candidates to the requesting organization (for directly contracted or seconded positions). Each year approximately 200 people – about 70 at any given time – are deployed in the field – in bilateral missions or in the context of OSCE, OHR, Council of Europe mission.

²⁵ The SEP roster was to some extent built on the model of the roster of humanitarian personnel that is maintained by the Swiss Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid.

Since the service only responds to direct requests for assistance, it has not been tailored to respond to the recruitment needs of DPKO.

Dialogue on placements in the UN system has focused on opportunities for junior experts (Junior Professional Officers, United Nations Volunteers and interns) and the inclusion of Swiss candidates in UN rosters. Since the roster is only searched in response to direct requests for seconded assistance, the service is not designed to respond to the recruitment needs of DPKO which are relayed via the Galaxy website rather than communicated directly to member states and their respective roster managers. However, in cooperation with the ‘presence of Switzerland in international organisations’ section in the Political Affairs Division (III), some candidates are encouraged to apply for positions in peacebuilding or peacekeeping through Galaxy. Nevertheless the activities outside the normal role of the SEP as an instrument for secondments remain relatively undeveloped, where this is, at least in part, due to the fact that the conditions of Swiss secondments are often more favourable than those of short-term DPKO contracts.

The Swiss case, like many other European rosters, is designed to help the government identify appropriate candidates to second to bilateral or multilateral operations. While it is not designed to pro-actively provide candidates for UN positions, it offers a one-stop roster service for deployable Swiss experts and would therefore be a natural contact point for DPKO as it seeks to develop its links with external roster managers. Moreover, most SEP experts, whether seconded or not, are deployed for at least two years. The roster is therefore suitable for short and longer-term deployments. The SEP roster managers have also focused on building the population of professionals with specific expertise. These include police officers with experience in security sector reform, peacebuilding and mediation experts, and professionals with experience of elections, transitional justice and international criminal law. Given that DPKO often experiences difficulties in attracting suitable candidates in some of these areas, exploring how SEP could better direct appropriate candidates to DPKO would be of mutual benefit.

4.3 Non-governmental international rosters

Comparative advantages of NGO rosters include their independence from government control and international pool of expertise.

There are an increasing number of Non-Governmental Organisations that operate in the post conflict space and engage in peacebuilding activities. This section does not provide an overview of the services provided by the sector as a whole but rather focuses on three examples of organisations that provide services designed to assist international organisations in the identification of civilian expertise.

One of the comparative advantages of non-governmental rosters is their independence. As noted above, there is a worry that government-controlled rosters tend to advance candidates who are national civil servants in line with national political preferences. Rosters that are managed independently of governments are essentially services, and it is in their interest to operate on the

merit principle since this is most likely to guarantee the success of their candidates. Accordingly, independently run rosters tend to be non-exclusive and open to members from a broad range of backgrounds, including the private and non-governmental sectors.

NGO rosters often function as services, where international organizations are priority clients.

Another comparative advantage of some non-governmental rosters is that their services can be tailored to the needs of international organisations, as priority clients. Some national and international rosters have been set up with this as a key mission (e.g. CANADEM). These rosters tend to be responsive to the changing needs and procedures of international organisations, including DPKO, and have the further advantage of offering services to International Organisations free of charge. Other independent non-profit organisations that are also geared to serving international organisations do charge a service fee however. For instance Red-R-IHE charges a fee for the identification of a short-list of suitable candidates (which is reduced for other non-governmental organisations). Yet NGO roster fees tend to be lower than fees of commercial recruitment agencies and professional head-hunters.

There are relatively few NGOs that provide roster recruitment services, because the market is still a relatively new and small one, compared, for example, with the broader development and humanitarian sectors.

Although there are an increasing number of NGOs offering services in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, there are still very few organisations that provide a roster or recruitment service for this growing sector. This is mainly because it is still a relatively new market with relatively few jobs compared, for example, with the broader development and humanitarian sectors. Moreover, as the demand for post-conflict capacity building has grown, rosters that were originally designed to service the humanitarian and development communities have expanded their scope to encompass post-conflict fields of expertise in areas such as DDR, SSR, rule of law, mediation and civil administration e.g. RedR-IHE.

Funding is also an issue, given the reluctance of many international organizations to outsource or pay for recruitment services.

A more generic reason for the limited number of NGO rosters of experts relates to the limited sources of their funding. The relatively small size of the sector and the reluctance of most international organisations to pay for the identification of candidates, means that it is difficult for roster managers to survive solely by charging for their recruitment services. Thus, the few NGO rosters that exist rely on core government or charitable support, which is also limited. Other organisations that are in the business of offering consultation or project implementation services in post-conflict contexts e.g. ILAC in the area of transitional justice, are potentially useful partners in identifying candidates through their network of specialised contacts, but such services tend to be in addition to their core business, and do not generate significant revenue for the organisation.

To date there has been little contact between DPKO and the non-governmental rosters described below. This is mainly because DPKO has no formal links with any external rosters and only accepts direct applications. Moreover, DPKO has not traditionally outsourced any recruitment tasks,

While some UN agencies and departments have used NGO services as a back up to regular mechanisms, this has not been the case with DPKO.

whereas other UN agencies or departments, notably UNHCR and UNDP have sometimes paid for the services of NGOs such as RedR-IHE to identify specialist experts. DPKO recruitment practices have not therefore supported, directly or indirectly, any external rosters and the Galaxy and Nucleus systems are blind to a candidate's membership in them. Nevertheless, PMSS staff are aware of the SAFDEM roster, and welcome this kind of initiative in so far as it might lead to an increased number of qualified candidates applying to DPKO positions from under-represented regions, in this case Africa.

4.3.1 The Southern African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Missions (SAFDEM)

SAFDEM was established to help international agencies identify suitable candidates from Africa for peace operations.

Traditionally Africans have been under-represented in terms of civilians deployed in international peace missions and it has been difficult for international agencies to identify suitable candidates from Africa for such missions. SAFDEM was established to address this in 2000 with a joint grant from the Canadian and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The roster currently contains some 160 vetted members with expertise in the following categories: human rights monitors and experts; specialists on vulnerable groups including women, children, HIV/AIDS and the elderly; lawyers with a human rights background; public health professionals; community development workers; and election observers and monitors. Candidates are paper-screened and interviewed before being placed on the register and are encouraged to participate in courses conducted by SAFDEM's partner training organisations, including the Durban-based 'Training for Peace Programme in Southern Africa' which provides 10-day theoretical and practical training courses for peacekeeping missions. Only 18 people have been deployed from the roster since 2002. No applications by members of the roster to DPKO positions through Galaxy have been successful. With regards DPKO positions, the SAFDEM roster managers note that they have difficulties understanding the UN grade system and precisely what experience is considered suitable for different levels. Moreover, they report that many of their members experience technical difficulties, often attributable to poor or unreliable internet connections, in applying for positions through Galaxy. This suggests that the present Galaxy system is not, in practice, equally accessible to all.

It maintains a small roster of 160 experts, of which only 18 have been employed in international missions since 2002.

There are a number of reasons for why SAFDEM has met with little success in terms of the uptake by international organisations of members from its roster. One is that it has no funds to second experts. The Nordem roster manager that deals mostly with funded deployments commented 'If we did not second people, I don't think we would have been very busy'. Another possible reason is the limited size of the roster population. This is, in part, because SAFDEM adopted the Norwegian model of maintaining a small roster, with emphasis on providing training services to its members. Arguably a more pro-active roster growth strategy that emphasised outreach and built up

The small size of the roster and the fact that SAFDEM does not offer funded deployments has limited its appeal to and uptake by international organizations.

a large population of experts, may have attracted more international attention (e.g. RedR-IHE). This suggests that strategies that are relevant for the development of rosters for funded deployments, which are designed to provide a small pool of pre-selected and relatively 'ready' experts, are not as appropriate for rosters which are essentially recruitment services, and as such need to offer either specialist services and/or as large a range of experts as possible with stream-lined supply systems, including just-in-time-screening.

There are also local reasons for the poor uptake of SAFDEM's services, suggesting that the SAFDEM experience may be unusually compromised.

In addition there are other possible local and organisationally-specific reasons for the poor uptake of SAFDEM's services. The local political context has placed strains on the working efficiency of the host organisation and it has, in addition, been beset with a number of managerial and personnel (rapid staff-turnover) set backs. Given that these reasons are largely specific to the organisation, the SAFDEM case may be exceptional. It is therefore difficult to draw lessons from this case regarding the broader utility of establishing rosters in regions that are under-represented. The experience of developed countries, in contrast, suggests that whether or not rosters are designed to be responsive to the needs of international organisations has a large impact on the identification of suitable candidates and the ultimate success of their applications.

4.3.2 Registered Engineers for Emergency Relief and the International Health Exchange (RedR-IHE)

Red R is an international federation of regional offices (in Australia, Canada, Eastern Africa, India, London and New Zealand) that helps meet the short and long-term personnel needs of humanitarian organisations. Each regional office provides different services, tailored to its clients. For example, the Australian office maintains a small pre-screened database of candidates for national secondments paid for by the Australian Department for Development.

RedR-IHE has over 25 years of experience in rostering civilian expertise and has one of the largest databases of over 20,000 professional aid workers.

RedR-IHE refers to the London-based operation. Established 25 years ago, it was one of the first rosters of international civilian expertise to be developed. The organisation was built on the merging of engineering and health expertise. The scope of the expertise in the large (20,000) on-line database is constantly expanding and currently includes a number of areas of relevance to peace operations including *inter-alia*: Administration, Capacity Building, Child Protection, Community Mobilisation, Conflict Resolution/Peacebuilding, Election Monitoring, Human Resources, Human Rights, IT, Institutional Development, Logistics, Mine Clearance and Awareness, Monitoring and Evaluation, Needs and Impact Assessment, and Training. In recent years the trend has been to expand the scope and quantity of the data-base population, with emphasis being given to improving on-line application procedures. To control costs, registrants are not screened before being placed on the database. Rather, in response to requests for candidate placements, RedR-IHE searches its database and conducts just-in-time and position-specific screening. On occasion and time permitting, it also advertises through its networks. Post-

It uses competitive electronic screening techniques to identify the strongest candidates in response to requests from NGOs and IOs, often for niche specialists or positions that have been difficult to fill.

RedR-IHE is constantly adapting its services to meet changing needs and may offer clients the possibility to access and search its roster (remotely) in future.

ILAC is a NGO that provides technical legal assistance in post conflict situations. It doesn't maintain a roster of experts but as a network organization represents over 3 million legal professionals worldwide.

specific, just-in-time screening can also involve interviews and testing, and the applications of the strongest available candidates are forwarded to the requesting agency. RedR-IHE also conducts a number of specialist recruitment activities including planning and conducting advertising campaigns, short-listing candidates, and HR and recruitment consultancy.

RedR-IHE recruits for over 50 different humanitarian organisations including UNHCR and UNICEF. For many larger organisational clients it is seen as a back up to their normal recruitment mechanisms and is used for finding candidates for specialist positions or to for vacant positions or positions which have historically been difficult to fill. While RedR-IHE has not been approached by DPKO, it is nevertheless open to developing new services and linkages with DPKO and others. This includes the possibility of sharing access to the Red-R IHE roster. Specifically, the Red-R roster managers have discussed the possibility of asking roster members to select which organisations they are willing to share their information with. Thereafter an agreement could be reached whereby the recruiting organisation had access to the sub-roster of all members that had opted to share their profile information with DPKO. DPKO could either search the roster directly (on-line) or request that Red-R undertake initial screening and present a short-list of candidates in response to a specific request or vacancy announcement.

4.3.3 The International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC)

ILAC has been operational since 2002, providing technical legal assistance in post conflict situations. With headquarters in Sweden, ILAC is a global NGO, with 34 member organisations with experience in providing technical assistance in post conflict situations. Its members represent over 3 million judges, prosecutors, lawyers and legal academics worldwide. ILAC is not principally used as a recruitment service for individual experts, and typically draws together teams of experts for specific assistance projects related to post conflict judicial reconstruction. While it does not maintain a database or roster of vetted rule of law experts, it offers valuable opportunities for international organisations including DPKO to widen the sources of recruitment for specialist expertise in judicial reform. This could build on past cooperation in the field. For example, since 2002 ILAC has deployed teams in agreement with (but not funded by) DPKO and local UN peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti and East Timor.

5. Challenges and Options for Interlinking

With only a finite, albeit growing, number of suitable experts and an increasing demand for their expertise, it seems sensible that roster managers establish linkages to make the most predictable and efficient use of available talent.

While linkages between roster managers should make more efficient use of available talent, there are no links between national roster managers, no inter-agency agreements for reciprocal access to databases, nor any formal links between DPKO and external rosters.

Concerns over the control over the selection process and competition relating to the ownership of data militate against sharing arrangements.

DPKO's commitment to maintaining control over the entire recruitment process is an obstacle to outsourcing and interlinkage.

While this has partially been achieved in the case of the International Humanitarian Partnership, a multinational initiative to pool humanitarian expertise, there are no parallel initiatives to interlink national rosters of personnel for peace operations. Nor are there many formal mechanisms for DPKO to link up with other rosters either within or external to the UN system. Regarding inter-agency cooperation, there is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between DPKO and the UN Volunteers (UNV) and between DPKO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). These are not inter-agency agreements for reciprocal access to personnel pools but do help DPKO identify potential candidates in these partner organizations. The links between external roster managers and DPKO tend to be non-existent, or informal and indirect. For instance, some roster managers alert their members to DPKO vacancy announcements and encourage them to apply directly to them through Galaxy. There is no means of tracking the success of these applications and many are never screened in time given the onerous volume of applications and limited recruitment resources.

5.1 Challenges for Interlinking

Challenges to pooling personnel

Rosters require buy in from their users – both those responsible for populating the roster and those responsible for recruitment. This is not always evident. In international organisations where civilian experts are effectively seconded (and directly paid for) by member states, issues over the political control of pre-selection have proven insurmountable and blocked plans to develop centralised, international rosters. For example, OSCE and EU member states have insisted on maintaining control over the selection of candidates for field missions. Thus neither organisation maintains rosters of candidates, although they retain control over the final selection decisions from a short-list of candidates proposed by member states. Concerns over control can also obstruct the sharing of personnel data even where deployments exclude 'gratis' personnel and are reimbursed directly by the contracting organisation. This is especially the case where the inter-agency relationship is characterised by overlapping competencies and a degree of competition relating to the ownership of data/personnel. This is familiar to the UN context, and efforts to pool human resource information between the UN agencies, including DPKO, UNDP, UNHCR and UNV, will need to surmount the challenges that fragmentation and competition bring.

The commitment to direct applications for DPKO positions

DPKO maintains direct control over the entire recruitment process. This is believed to be the best way of ensuring 'the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity in the employment of staff, with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution' as per its mandate from the

General Assembly. As a result, DPKO is committed to direct applications for DPKO positions and establishing and maintaining in-house rosters of candidates for DPKO positions. However, this commitment to direct recruitment is a barrier to effectively outsourcing the work of identifying and/or pre-screening candidates to others, including external roster managers.

Implications of the no gratis personnel ruling

Links with rosters that typically deploy seconded experts are curtailed as a result of the no gratis personnel ruling.

In addition, as a consequence of the General Assembly resolutions²⁶ restricting the use of gratis personnel in DPKO missions, DPKO has not actively developed contacts with national managers of civilian rosters that tend to second personnel to international operations. Since all DPKO jobs are now advertised on the web site and DPKO no longer reaches out to national roster managers, this has led to the estrangement of DPKO with some national roster managers, giving some of them the impression that DPKO is increasingly closed to, or unable to process, applications from external candidates.

Standardisation and interoperability

As a result, most national and non-governmental rosters have not tailored their services to meeting DPKOs needs and may thus experience more difficulty in identifying suitable candidates.

Most external national and non-governmental rosters have been developed in the last five years to serve the needs of bilateral missions or other international organizations to which their governments nominate candidates. They have not been tailored to the recruitment needs of DPKO and, as a result, it is not always easy to search these rosters on the basis of DPKO job descriptions or grades. While most of the rosters reviewed in this paper include categories of competence that overlap with those of DPKO, in the absence of common procedures for the nomination of candidates or classification systems and standards, it may still be difficult for roster managers to identify suitable candidates in response to requests from DPKO or DPKO vacancy announcements. This might be addressed through targeted information campaigns/outreach strategies directed at national roster managers. These should aim to increase understanding of DPKO staff functions and establish equivalence with positions in other regional organizations (see recommendations below).

Competition for limited human resources

While most national roster managers point out that the market for international civilian experts is small given the relatively small number of deployments each year, there is still competitive pressure for certain niche

²⁶ General Assembly resolutions 51/243 of 15 September 1997 and 52/234 of 26 June 1998, as implemented in ST/AI/1999/6. There are nevertheless still exceptions to the no gratis personnel rule. The article applies only to 'type II' gratis personnel, who are personnel provided to the United Nations by a Government or other entity responsible for the remuneration of the services of such personnel and do not serve under any other established regime such as that applicable to interns, associate experts or personnel provided on a non-reimbursable loan. Examples of gratis personnel employed in DPKO missions include: a team of 5 Ericsson IT experts in Haiti; a German civil registry expert in East Timor, and a German prison reform expert and four Norwegian experts in UNMIK, Kosovo.

Competition for the strongest candidates and/or niche experts in short supply also serves as a barrier to the sharing of personnel information.

The efficiency of screening candidates in the Nucleus database, for a particular vacancy or for rostering purposes, could be improved through the use of more powerful electronic search tools, by adopting a more competitive approach to screening and by using consultants to strengthen technical screening capacities.

specialists and senior experienced personnel, particularly within the UN system. This can serve as an obstacle to sharing information human resources between agencies or roster holders and has prompted pleas for increasing standardisation of remuneration and terms and conditions to minimise forum shopping by candidates.

5.2 Options for improving efficiency

The preceding overview of external rosters identified a number of practices in roster management that may bring efficiency gains if translated into the DPKO context. Options for increasing the efficiency of screening include:

- Limiting the number of unsuitable applications received through Galaxy, by exploring ways of ensuring that only those candidates that meet the minimum requirements can apply through the on-line application procedure. This might include introducing 'killer' questions, which if answered negatively would effectively terminate the application procedure for that position/grade.
- Increasing the quality of automated, electronic screening of candidates, in accordance with the requirements described in Vacancy Announcements, by developing or adapting a search engine tool.
- Improving the search and screening functionality of the Nucleus database by researching off-the-shelf recruitment and database software with a view to either informing the continued development of the Nucleus database or to possibly replacing it with an alternative package.
- Improving the efficiency and speed of screening by adopting a more competitive approach. This would use search engines and/or other electronic screening tools to seek out the best candidates (with the most relevant expertise) rather than those that meet the minimum requirements.
- Increasing the technical screening capacity of PMSS by using consultants. These would be experts with a broad range of relevant technical/field expertise and knowledge of DPKO recruitment needs.

5.3 Options for broadening the sources of recruitment

The following sections include a number of short term and longer term options that DPKO could explore to develop linkages with other roster managers. While specific timelines are not given, in general all short-term options could be initiated immediately. Long-term options would require

broader organisational buy-in. In cases where options include outsourcing of pre-screening functions, long term options would need to follow a transitional phase (at least five years), during which short-term options were implemented, found to be effective and worthy of further development.

Broadening internal sources of recruitment: Linking with other UN agencies

Within the UN family, further efforts could be made to pool personnel information.

Short term

- Engage in inter-agency consultation process on common terms and conditions for deployment of civilian experts.
- Develop a MoU for reciprocal access to recruitment databases with other UN departments or agencies including UNDP, UNHCR and UNV.

Long term

- Develop a consolidated inter-agency roster for civilian expertise covering occupational groups that are needed across agencies e.g. DDR, SSR, security officers, logistics officers. Explore options for linking or consolidating existing databases, rather than creating new ones.
- Explore how the Nucleus roster could be linked with others in other UN agencies.

Linking with established external rosters and sharing the recruitment burden

DPKO could adopt an 'explore and exploit' approach to linking with external rosters.

Short term

- Engage in targeted outreach to external roster managers to explain DPKO staff requirements and establish chart of equivalence with positions in other organisations so as to encourage and improve the suitability of their referrals in response to DPKO Vacancy Announcements.
- Develop procedures and criteria for the selection of national, regional and international roster managers that could serve as feeder mechanisms for DPKO recruitment. Thereafter broaden the review process in the UN system, with a view to developing MoUs with external roster managers to service DPKO and other interested UN agencies. This might allow for:

Agreements with external roster managers could result in these roster managers feeding pre-selected candidates into DPKO recruitment procedures in response to Vacancy Announcements or direct requests from DPKO.

- One MoU to be agreed per country for the nomination of national experts, although, where rosters are managed by non-governmental organisations, the agreement could be made directly with them. Generic MoUs could be developed to this end (see the following point).
- Additional MoUs to be developed for international roster managers (open to all nationalities) that could help identify candidates from under-represented regions or with specialist expertise that DPKO (and other agencies) have found difficult to attract through normal channels.
- The internal agreement of procedures and timelines to guide the implementation and development of these inter-linking initiatives.

Agreements could also provide for fast track procedures in response to urgency requests.

- Develop and agree MoUs with existing national roster managers, whereby identified contact points in national roster managers would agree to respond to DPKO vacancy announcements (preferably sent directly to them), within a given timeframe by selecting a limited (to be established by DPKO) number of candidates to be considered for these posts. Roster managers would ensure that their selected candidates also introduced their application through Galaxy so that the candidate's details would be entered in the Nucleus system. MoUs with external roster managers would be for agreed for a limited time, say two years, but could be renewed with the agreement of both parties.²⁷
- Galaxy and Nucleus should be adapted so that candidates submitted by rosters with which DPKO had an agreement are automatically flagged as such.
- Include procedures for rapid nomination arrangements in these MoUs. This might include urgency requests, with short response timelines. Responses would need to be entered into the Galaxy system but a contact point in PMSS would also be notified of the nominations and arrangements would be made within PMSS for fast-track screening of applications in response to such urgency requests.

Long term

- *Direct applications from nationals of member states that have signed MoUs with DPKO should no longer be permitted.*

²⁷ Should DPKO make its MoUs conditional on minimum standards relating to independence, openness and selection procedures? The risk is that this would be too difficult to control and would be unpopular with member states. Performance may be a better indicator, and DPKO should reserve the right to terminate MoU agreements with no obligation to give a reason for doing so (in the case that roster managers do not generate suitable nominations).

In the long term DPKO could completely outsource pre-selection of candidates to be placed on the Nucleus roster to national roster managers. This would mean that direct applications from candidates from those countries would no longer be accepted.

This would require that DPKO have confidence that the breadth of the sources of recruitment and quality of selection would not be compromised. National roster managers would need to have comprehensive rosters and a proven track record in merit based selection for DPKO.

Given that human resources in PMSS are limited and unlikely to match the exponential growth of applications through Galaxy, and that direct applications are a relatively inefficient means feeding in suitable (and geographically diverse) candidates since they inevitably generate a large percentage of unsuitable applications, DPKO should only undertake the work of initial screening where this can not effectively be outsourced through framework agreements with established national or regional rosters managers.

Whether a candidate was introduced onto a DPKO short-list via a national roster feeder mechanism, or through the internal screening process, the final selection of personnel would still be conducted by DPKO on the principle of merit. Thus, the use of external rosters as feeder mechanisms would share the workload of initial screening but not the political control. It would also help ensure that a geographically diverse but limited number of candidates were received from external rosters and enable DPKO to control the number of applications it would accept from each country. Candidates from countries or regions that do not have rosters and MoUs in place would also benefit as a result of more screening resources being liberated to process their applications in a timely manner (see below).

This proposal would require that DPKO have confidence that the quality and range of candidates would not be compromised through such outsourcing arrangements. This certainly need not be the case. Indeed, the quality of screening to check resume details or to evaluate educational or work experience should be enhanced when conducted locally by those most familiar with national contexts and standards. Moreover, local rosters managers may be better placed to attract applications from a broader range of sources. However, DPKO would need to be confident of this. Such confidence could be established over time with experience of working with national roster managers while also accepting direct applications from national applicants. In addition, MoUs could be made conditional on high standards relating to independence, openness and transparent selection procedures, although this might prove difficult to verify²⁸. Performance may be a better indicator and DPKO should reserve the right to terminate MoU agreements with no obligation to give a reason for doing so (in the case that roster managers do not generate suitable nominations).

²⁸ Although quality control measures could be included in MoUs. These might include complaints procedures whereby candidates that had a complaint about national rosters could lodge it both with the manager in question and with a contact point at DPKO.

Redressing the imbalance: Improving access for candidates from under-represented geographical areas

Short term

To help DPKO identify suitable candidates from under-represented regions, DPKO could enter into agreements with international roster managers to feed in candidates from these regions into regular DPKO recruitment procedures in response to Vacancy Announcements or specific requests.

- Develop MoUs with international and regional roster managers to identify suitable candidates from under-represented regions. Unlike the generic MoU for a Stand-by Roster that was developed in 2004 but like the MoUs proposed above, these agreements would request that roster managers select a specific number of candidates, to be determined by DPKO, in response to a request from DPKO within a specific timeframe. These candidates would still be required to apply through Galaxy, but their applications would be flagged in Galaxy as having been submitted after pre-selection by an external roster manager. International roster managers would only be required to select candidates from countries which do not have signed MoUs with DPKO.
- Encourage member states to develop independent rosters in countries and regions that have none. Indicate that DPKO will develop MoU's with these independent roster management organisations (as above) as an incentive for member states and donors to support such initiatives. DPKO, ideally together with other UN agencies, might help generate additional bilateral support for the establishment of rosters in under-represented regions through feasibility studies and/or lessons learned workshops with interested parties.

Long term

In the long term, DPKO could focus its outreach and pre-selection resources to attracting and initially clearing candidates from countries that do not have national rosters and agreements to feed in candidates to DPKO.

- *Reserve the use of UN screening resources for the initial clearance of candidates from countries or regions that do not have national roster mechanisms and MoUs agreed with the UN (as above) in place.*

Given that the vast majority of countries with established roster mechanisms are in the economically developed world, it is also fair that these countries share the burden of initial pre-screening, while limited UN resources are used to process applications from countries that do not have these resources and mechanisms in place.

- After an MoU was signed with a national roster manager, there would be a period of some years in which DPKO accepted direct applications as well as nominations from roster managers. Thereafter MoUs could include sunset clauses whereby direct applications to DPKO from candidates from those countries will only be accepted until a specified date.

Options for linking with other regional organisations

Short term

Initial Efforts to link up with regional organizations might aim to explain organizational recruitment needs to member states and explore joint pre-deployment training initiatives

- Consult with the EU and OSCE regarding the mechanisms they have developed for the nomination of national experts, to help ensure that MoUs concluded between the UN and national roster managers are compatible with these where possible.
- Hold recruitment training seminars jointly with the OSCE and EU, to help explain organisational recruitment needs and recruitment procedures to existing national roster managers.
- Explore joint pre-deployment training initiatives.

Longer term

In relation to the AU, DPKO could support the establishment of an AU civilian deployment capacity, including through efforts to share personnel data.

- Engage in consultations with the AU about the development of an AU roster of deployable civilian experts. Agree to share data from Nucleus about candidates from AU countries with the AU. Encourage the AU to adopt compatible recruitment practices and take advantage of lessons learned in the UN system. Nevertheless encourage the AU to develop a more decentralised inter-linked system, using member states and/or other African regional organisations such as ECOWAS or SADC to feed in candidates in response to vacancy announcements where possible. This should help generate national and regional capacity and keep AU recruitment costs down.

In relation to the EU, DPKO could explore modalities in which EU civilian deployments could be mobilized to support UN-led missions, including the rapid deployment of surge capacity through Civil Response Teams.

- Explore whether an agreement could be reached with the EU, whereby the EU would agree that the roster managers in its member states would respond to DPKO vacancy announcements directly, providing a selection of potential candidates to DPKO within a specified time frame. This might eliminate the need for DPKO to conclude agreements with all 25 member states separately and should build on both organisations' commitment to improving co-operation in crisis management.
- Explore with the EU whether modalities could be developed for the rapid deployment of Civilian Response Teams to UN operations to provide surge capacity in response to a specific requests for assistance.
- Explore modalities for mobilising EU civilian deployments in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy to support UN-led missions.

Attachments

Annex 1

List of interviews

(names are in alphabetical order within each subcategory)

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Personnel Management and Support Service

Chaste Abimana	Head of Recruitment and Placement Section
Mary Dellar	Human Resources Officer
Michael Emery	Chief, Career Development Unit
Bettina Feichtinger	Human Resources Officer, Recruitment and Placement Section
Michael Morano	Information Technology Officer, Information Management Unit
Nyaguthie Ngetha-Mungai	Team Leader, Recruitment and Placement Section

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Barrie Meyers,	Senior Adviser to the Director Human Resources, Recruitment Section
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European Union

Pedro Ataide	DGE IX, Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
Patrick Dupont	Unit for Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention, External Relations Directorate General, European Commission
Alexander Mclachlan	Unit for Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention, External Relations Directorate General, European Commission

National Rosters

CANADEM

www.canadem.ca

Paul LaRose-Edwards	Executive Director
Christine Vincent	Director of Operations

France Coopération Internationale

www.fci.gouv.fr

Eric Tonon

ZIF – Centre for International Peace Operations

www.zif-berlin.org

Jens Behrendt	Head of Recruitment
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NORDEM

www.humanrights.uio.no

Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights

Siri Skåre	Programme Director
Norwegian Crisis Response Pool	
Sissel Wilsgaard	Ministry of Justice

Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP)

www.eda.admin

Regina Escher	Head of the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding
Claudia Moser	Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding



Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit

www.postconflict.gov.uk

Jack Jones

Resource Manager

Chris Trott

Head of Policy and Strategy

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) www.crs.state.gov

Chris Hoh

Director, Response Strategy and Resource Management Team

Gary Russell

Response Strategy and Resource Management Team

International NGOs

SAFDEM

www.safdem.org.zw

Southern African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peace-building Missions

Eustace Chiwombe

Programme Officer

ILAC

International Legal Assistance Consortium

www.ilac.se

Christian Åhlund

Executive Director

RedR – International Humanitarian Experts

www.redr.org/london

Laura Byrne

Recruitment Services Manager

Annex 2 Recruitment of civilian experts in regional organisations

	OSCE	EU - Council	EU- Commission
Name of database	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT)	No centralised database for deployment to missions. Council Secretariat identifies capability needs for individual missions and member states nominate experts in response to calls: There will also be no centralised roster for Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) – a rapid needs assessment/ surge capability. However, the Council Secretariat is exploring the establishment of an in-house roster of candidates for contracted positions.	Civilian experts accessed in a number of ways, including: 1) EU Roster for 1200 election observers. 2) 6000 member state experts sent on mission annually through the Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) 3) private sector expertise mobilised through framework agreements with agencies. 4) In future there will also be a roster of in-house experts to comprise Advanced Planning Teams (APTs) available at short notice for missions for up to one month.
Agents responsible for roster management	There is no centralised roster managed by the OSCE secretariat. The secretariat is responsible, together with the head of mission, for recruitment from nominations by member states.	N/A	For EU Election Observers Roster and Advanced Planning Teams: DG External Relations. For Technical Assistance Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) and framework agreements on the provision of private sector expertise: Europe Aid
Agents responsible for selecting candidates to place in roster.	Candidates must be nominated by Member States (and will be seconded by them if selected)	Member States nominate candidates for seconded positions. The Head of Mission makes the selection.	For election observers: The EC selects head of mission and core team. Election observers are self-nominated but screened by member states before being placed on the EU Election Observation Roster. For seconded experts through TAIEX, EC calls on network of contact points in member states' ministries and can select personnel from the 'TAIEX Stock Exchange' – a web based roster. For other consultants, the EC selects personnel with the assistance of recruiting agencies.

	OSCE	EU - Council	EU- Commission
Size: Number of personnel in database	0	0 However, approximately 100 experts will be ready for deployment in CRTs by the end of 2006, and member states have pledged over 2000 personnel for civilian operations under the ESDP framework.	1200 in EU Election Observation Roster. 6000 seconded experts sent on short-term missions through the TAIEX programme each year. Over 1000 external experts on agencies' databases serving the EC. Advanced Planning teams: Roster not yet established
Scope: Number of skill sets/job descriptions included	The OSCE skill-set /job description matrix is comprised of 48 boxes. This is based on a grid of 12 fields of expertise (FoEs) and 4 levels of professional competence (see below). FoEs include: administration and support; civilian police; democratisation; economic and environmental affairs; education; elections; general staff/monitoring functions; human rights; media affairs; military affairs; political affairs; and rule of law.	ESDP job descriptions principally in the area of: police, rule of law, civil administration and monitoring. Some other specialisations (DDR, SSR, human rights, press advisors) foreseen for mission support /strengthening the offices of EU Special Representatives.	The TAIEX programme operates in the candidate countries, Western Balkans and Neighbourhood countries. Fields of expertise cover all areas of the 'acquis communautaire' with over 1000 experts in freedom, security and justice, human rights and migration.
Rapid deployment Features	Options of 2, 4 or 8 week availability on application form. Average time from nomination to arrival in mission is 73 days.	Most ESDP missions are deployed relatively rapidly (+/- two months from decision to launch of mission) CRTs to be deployed within 5 days of a request of the SG/HR.	All technical assistance experts can be mobilised at short notice.
Maintenance: Provisions for updating data	N/A	Responsibility of Member States. The Council Secretariat regularly sends out questionnaires to member states, requiring them to update their commitments (numbers of experts available in broadly identified categories).	Evaluations of deployed election observers are fed into the Election Roster database.
Quality control: selection criteria vetting tracking performance	While general minimum requirements are low (English language, good health and driving licence) each job description relates to one of the four levels of professional experience (senior management, senior professional, middle management and professional). These have minimum experience/skill	The Council Secretariat (DGE IX) has developed generic job descriptions and sets minimum experience standards for strategic, managerial and technical-level positions. It has also elaborated a Code of Conduct and is involved in pre-screening of applications.	Election observers: Minimum requirements are defined in EU Guidelines Vetting involves EC staff checking that CVs meet these minimum requirements Performance is tracked through evaluations included in roster database.

	OSCE	EU - Council	EU- Commission
	set requirements i.e. Senior management -- advanced relevant education and at least 10 years experience, 5 of which at management level in field relevant to actual position; senior professional -- advanced degree and 6 years experience etc. Additional mission-specific requirements (e.g. language) may be included in vacancy notices. Screening in capitals and in Secretariat.		
Utility: number of personnel selected from rosters to go on mission (in 2004)	Currently there are: 782 seconded posts, 622 of which are filled; 281 directly contracted posts, 250 of which are filled and 2500 contracted national staff.	Over 2000 experts have participated in civilian ESDP operations (including rotations). On 30 November 2005: 807 seconded staff, 85 international contracted staff and 557 national contracted staff were engaged in EU civilian ESDP missions.	Approximately 1000 election observers 6000 technical assistance experts on short term (two week) missions through TAIEX
Cost: Staff resources/ budget for roster management	0 for roster management but 6 recruitment/screening staff in Secretariat for seconded staff (can be reinforced in times of rapid deployment)		A 'few' staff for election roster management. Over 50 for managing the TAIEX programme.
Links with UN system	None (although pre-mission police training based on CIVPOL models) (No lessons in terms of roster management but positive example of HQ-field co-operation in recruitment and transparency of mission needs for member states (simple, user-friendly-matrix)	None (potentially useful if EU personnel can be deployed directly or in teams to UN missions).	None (potentially useful for joint needs-assessment missions with APTs and possibly UN could explore agreement with EC with regard accessing its technical assistance experts)

Annex 3

National rosters

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
Name and status of legal entity	CANADEM An incorporated not-for profit organisation funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Canada.	France Coopèration Internationale (FCI) A public interest group, with core financial support from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	ZIF Centre for International Peace Operations funded by the Foreign Ministry.	NORDEM Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights is based at the University of Oslo and funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. The Norwegian Crisis Response Pool is managed by the Norwegian Ministry of Justice.	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department Operations Team (CHAD OT) within DFID, together with Crown Agents, a commercial Company.	The Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding (SEP) Part of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
Size: Number of personnel in database	7500	FCI maintains a list of some 1000 experts (not in a database) but also relies on a network of ministerial liaison officers across the administration to identify experts .	900	150 in rapidly deployable standby force out of a total of 350 in Resource base. 30 in rule of law crisis response pool. This will rise to 40 in 2006.	Currently approx. 200, to be expanded to 400 by March 2006.	Over 500
Scope: Categories of competence included	Skills are broken down into 29 categories in a general skills list and 10 substantive categories: human rights, peacebuilding, rule	Areas of competence include inter alia: Administrative reform, Post-crisis reconstruction, customs and police	16 categories, including: democratisation, elections, human rights, rule of law, public administration, media development,	10 categories in NORDEM stand-by force roster including: election observers, technical election support, election experts, political	124 competences, divided into 8 categories (economic, governance, infrastructure, logistics, management/support,	The roster includes the following categories of expertise: democratisation/good-governance, protection, human rights, elections,

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
	of law, governance, democratisation, elections, policing, security, administration and reconstruction. These are in turn sub-divided. E.g. Governance skills list broken down into 7 categories including: institutions, organisational management, development management, public administration, settlements, governance situation assessments and peace and security.	co-operation, DDR.	public information, political affairs, mission administration and support, infrastructure and economic affairs, monitoring, DDR, humanitarian affairs, refugees, reconciliation	analysis, local governance, independent media, good governance, legal reform, human rights monitors, investigators of gross violations of human rights The Crisis Response Pool is for experts in the rule of law and includes judges, public prosecutors, police lawyers and prison service managers	public services, health, security and justice)	mediation, judicial affairs, rule of law, support for civil administration, gender issues, civilian police, customs, and forensic pathology.
Geographical scope	Limited to Canadian nationals and those entitled to work in Canada.	Limited to French nationals.	Limited to German nationals	Limited to those residing in Norway (not only Norwegians)	International scope: Not limited to UK nationals	Limited to Swiss nationals
Rapid Deployment features	Members must confirm availability within 48 hours. Deployment typically takes 4-8 weeks. CANDEP: Helps provide surge capacity with	Experts are typically employed for 2 to 8 weeks.		150 members in NORDEM stand-by-force ready to take on assignments of up to six months at short notice (1-3 weeks)	3-tier system of database, whereby tier one is high-readiness category with tried and tested members. PCRU staff would form nucleus of teams selected from tier 1. Commercial	Deployment typically takes 2 weeks. In special cases it is possible within 72 hours. Time needed for the identification of candidates depends on the required profile. Mechanisms

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
	service package (contracting, briefing and administrative support) to help deploy and maintain experts in the field.			Members of the rule of law Crisis Response Pool should be ready at four weeks notice for assignments of up to 1 year (in some cases longer).	agents such as Adam Smith International might also be required to arrange numbers of contracted experts.	in place for rapid contracting, briefing and logistical support.
Maintenance Provisions for updating data	Members are asked to update their CV and personal data by e-mail.		Members of the pool are automatically reminded to update their personal files on-line at regular intervals.	All members are required to confirm availability once a year. Employers must co-sign indicating awareness and support. Membership in the crisis response pool is for 2 years.		Members of the pool are required to fill in a questionnaire every six months. This provides updates on availability status and newly acquired skills.
Relationship management	Postings are made on CANADEM's job postings website. A list service (CANADEM –E) provides information on other relevant jobs, academic and training opportunities, and updates on CANADEM's registrant services. The CANADEM Experts Forum is another on-line forum to share		A members section of the ZIF website includes discussion forum, alumni directory, message board, and postings of international job vacancies.	All members receive quarterly NORDEM newsletter.	Members sent electronic updates of planning and sectoral guidance methodologies. Electronic bulletins being considered.	Information is published on the website www.eda.admin.ch/content/sub_expool/e/home.html Posts can also be announced on www.cinfo.ch

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
	information relevant to career development in the sector.					
Roster growth strategy	Strategic targeted recruitment to: 1. bring in the next generation of Canadian experts and 2. to fill gaps, for example new skill sets being asked for by the international community.		Headhunting strategy designed to address short-falls in international missions.	To maintain current levels. Gender balance is an important consideration both in recruitment to the roster and in deployment. For the rule of law Crisis Response Pool, plans are to increase the pool from 30 to 40 in 2006. This will increase the number of prosecutors (currently 3) police lawyers (currently 3) and war lawyers (currently 2) in particular.	Linking with other national databases. Governmental: (DFID (humanitarian), FCO (police), Home Office (security and justice experts) and Crown Prosecution Service (prosecutors). Non-governmental: Crown Agents, Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (Red R), International Health Exchange, Law Society Bar Service, International: Existing: International Humanitarian Partnership Future: explore links with other like-minded countries to forge reciprocal access agreements.	
Quality control	<u>Selection criteria:</u> <u>Vetting:</u> Paper screening of all applicants and advance screening of most registrants to the short-list standard.		<u>Vetting:</u> screening of on-line profile and interviews/evaluation process during basic training course required before placement on the roster.	<u>Selection:</u> all candidates are paper screened (to pass minimum standards) prior to interview and compulsory participation in the	<u>Vetting:</u> tier 1 candidates have established relationship with PCRU. Tier 2 DPE's have interviews and references checked.	<u>Minimum standards include:</u> driving licence, language skills, at least three years professional experience, field experience and specialist knowledge.

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
	<p>Screening focuses on interpersonal skills and personal capacities to work in international field missions. Referees are asked to complete confidential questionnaires. CANADEM follows up on inconsistencies and possible gaps or weaknesses.</p> <p><u>Tracking performance:</u> CANADEM collects UN FOPAs and PAS where possible and is beginning to do more targeted performance screening on registrants after they receive their first position through CANADEM.</p>			<p>6-day introductory training course</p> <p><u>Evaluation:</u> the immediate superior of the secondee is required to fill out a NORDEM evaluation form which is submitted to the Secretariat.</p> <p>For the Crisis response Pool, members are nominated by their employers. They must meet minimum professional requirements. Members must be between 30 and 60 years of age but and most are senior professionals.</p>		<p>Candidates for pool membership fill in an extensive questionnaire.</p> <p><u>Vetting:</u> Before deployment candidates are interviewed twice, take a written English test, and have oral tests in other languages if required.</p>

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
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Training	CANADEM does not offer training courses, but provides information on training centres and courses in Canada.		Participation in ZIF basic training course required except in cases where equivalent training and experience can be demonstrated.	All members of the stand-by force receive a 6-day introductory course. NORDEM also runs a 3-day course on election observation.	Rolling training in how to work in hostile environments and how to work with PCRU offered to DCE's in tier 1 and 2. Training outsourced to Crown Agents.	Each candidate must normally participate in a 2-week peacebuilding course.
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	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
				Members of the response pool attend a rule of law fieldwork course run by Nordem		
Utility	In 2005, 811 registrants were selected to go on missions. Since its inception 10,387 were submitted, 2,577 shortlisted and 1,933 selected.		Currently 100 members of the pool on UN mandated or led missions, 80 on OSCE missions and 20 on EU missions.	In 2004: 96 contracts with Foreign Ministry for seconded personnel. 43% long term over six months). 57% of all contracts for election observation missions, of which 60% were short term assignments. 5 currently seconded to the UN. Approx. 20 members of crisis response pool currently on mission, in BiH, Georgia and Afghanistan.		Each year approximately 200 people – about 70 at any given time on average – are deployed in the field. These are normally secondees, and their salaries are paid by the Swiss Government. Deployments are typically for between six months and two years.
Cost	The Foreign Ministry funds the CANADEM roster with \$500,000 a year. 7 full-time staff and 5 part-time staff are employed to work on it.		5 permanent staff responsible for screening, interviewing, contracting, deployment, in and post-service support. Budget not disclosed.	3 staff funded by Foreign Ministry, with additional resources from 10% administration fee charged for secondment work. 4.5 million NOK (+/- US \$690,000) dedicated to roster	3 human resources staff dedicated to roster management and expansion.	The Pool is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employs 9 staff.

	Canada	France	Germany	Norway	UK	Switzerland
				management, This represents 17 % of total organisational turnover.		
Links with UN	Informal arrangements whereby CANADEM notifies PMSS of candidates that have applied for positions from the CANADEM roster. CANADEM received notification that DPKO was willing to explore MoU agreements in 2004.		No formal links. ZIF proposed MoU with DPKO in 2003, but this has not been developed.	From 1996-1998 NORDEM had MoU with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, which enabled NORDEM to provide pre-screened seconded experts in response to specific requests from UNHCHR. No formal links at present. The Crisis Response Pool has no formal links with DPKO but did receive one request for a prosecutor to be seconded to DRC in 2004 (not realised).	No formal links.	Informal discussion on the placement of Swiss candidates in UN rosters. Dialogue on placements and opportunities for junior experts (JPOs, UNVs and interns).

Annex 4

International Non-Governmental Rosters

	SAFDEM	ILAC	RedR-IHE
Name and legal status	<p>Southern African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peace-building Missions</p> <p>Not-for profit organization based in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe Funded by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</p>	<p>International Legal Assistance Consortium</p> <p>A global NGO, based in Sweden, has 34 member organisations with experience in providing technical legal assistance in post conflict situations. Its member organisations represent over 3 million judges, prosecutors, lawyers and academics worldwide.</p>	<p>Red R – International Health Exchange</p> <p>RedR-IHE is part of an International Federation of regional offices (in Australia, Canada, Eastern Africa, India, London and New Zealand) that aim to provide competent and effective relief personnel to front-line humanitarian agencies.</p>
Size number of personnel in database	160 cleared personnel, plus pending applications		20,000
Scope of skill sets	<p><u>Humanitarian and peacebuilding</u> with a focus on 7 categories including: human rights monitors and experts, specialists on vulnerable groups, monitoring and evaluation experts, legal specialists with a human rights backgrounds, public health professionals, community development workers, election observers and monitors.</p>	<p>Broad scope of Rule of Law activities, with a focus on post conflict judicial reconstruction, including, inter alia, expertise in capacity building, criminal law, human rights, gender justice, and support for development of bar associations. ILAC has been operational since 2002, and so far focus has been on criminal law and human rights, but the organisation has the intention and potential, once the recipients are ready, to also get involved in other areas of legal reconstruction</p>	<p>Broad scope of humanitarian activities including, inter-alia, expertise in: Human rights, institutional capacity building, logistics, management, election monitoring, public and media relations, human resources, conflict resolution and peacebuilding.</p>
Geographical scope	Citizens and residents of Africa	Global	Global
Rapid deployment features	All members are made aware of the need to be available on short notice. Time required by each individual is confirmed during the interview process and on average members are available within 2 weeks.	Terms of reference for candidates can be sent to members immediately. With a notice of about 4 weeks, ILAC will send an assessment team in country to identify projects of assistance, which can be implemented by member organisations	
Provisions	Registered members are	Once the terms of	Candidates register in

	SAFDEM	ILAC	RedR-IHE
for updating data	periodically reminded to update their details via email, the newsletter, the web site and during annual meetings. All information is updated through email.	reference have been identified, ILAC relies on nominations from its member organisations to produce short lists of qualified candidates, from which the members of the assessment teams are appointed. The list is current for each request.	the RedR database by completing an on-line personal history form at http://onlinejobs.redr.org . This can be updated at any time by the candidate.
Relationship management	A quarterly newsletter is send to members (contains information on SAFDEM current activities, training opportunities, general information of interest and links to useful resources) Jobs and training opportunities are send to members via email Jobs, training and other information is also posted on the web site. At least one seminar is held for members in each particular region or country annually	Day to day contacts with member organisations through e-mail. The ILAC Council with 21 members holds regular teleconferences. The Annual General Meeting provides an opportunity for all members to meet face to face. ILAC produces a quarterly newsletter	Regular contacts with clients and candidates and targeted advertising for specialist skill sets.
Roster growth strategy:	SAFDEM recruits for the roster throughout the year Targeted recruitment in response to skills in demand, this includes posting adverts in regional news circulars, using the web site etc. Establishing regional connections with training organizations, which have a specific focus (e.g. SAHRIT has 3 courses a year in human rights related topics, TfP has the CPPC training) Regional representatives stationed in various countries recruit for the roster Visiting mission areas promoting SAFDEM and also recruiting individuals already working in missions	Considering that the member organisations already represent some 3 million judges, prosecutors and lawyers worldwide, there is no need for a roster growth strategy. ILAC will continue to add members to the consortium, as appropriate.	Now that the roster is open (members are not pre-screened), it is increasing rapidly in size (approximately 30 new members a day). The range of skill sets is also increasing and RedR-IHE is broadening the range of recruitment services it offers to its clients.
Quality control selection criteria/minimum standards vetting tracking performance	<u>Minimum standards</u> <u>Vetting:</u> All candidates are paper screened and interviewed before being placed on the roster. Vetting—initial screening is through documents submitted by the applicant (application form and CV). If the individual looks potentially suitable, references are checked before calling the individual for a face-to-face interview. The screening	When there is a request, terms of reference specific to the current requirement, including, inter-alia, language, cultural and regional expertise, are sent to ILAC member organizations for nomination of qualified candidates for the assessment mission. Quality control of the candidates is carried out in	Until 2004, RedR-IHE interviewed all potential members of the roster. Now vetting only takes place when the roster is being searched in response to a specific request. At a minimum this involves CV vetting and, can also involve interviews, reference checking and first interviews (to short-list

	SAFDEM	ILAC	RedR-IHE
	<p>process checks for interpersonal skills and capacity to work in missions and clarifies availability of the applicant.</p> <p>Minimum requirements are: degree or 3 year training, at least 3 years experience in relevant field, NGO experience, computer literacy and preferably one international language.</p> <p>Members who do not respond to emails repeatedly especially in relation to jobs are removed from the database.</p>	<p>two steps: in nominations by the member organisations and in the final selection by ILAC</p>	<p>standard).</p>
Training	<p>SAFDEM has MoU with Durban-based 'Training for Peace Programme in Southern Africa' which provides 10-day theoretical and practical training courses for peacekeeping missions. Participation in the courses is not obligatory for registration on the SAFDEM roster.</p>		<p>RedR-IHE organises a number of open training events and also offers customised training services around the world, many of which focus on personal security.</p>
Utility number of deployed personnel	<p>18 people have been deployed since 2002</p>	<p>Teams deployed in agreement with (but not funded by) DPKO and local UN peacekeeping missions since 2002 include: Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia Haiti and East Timor.</p>	<p>100-150 a year</p>
Cost Resources for roster management	<p>665 000 NOK (US \$100,000) from the Norwegian MFA for the period October 2004 to December 2005</p> <p>3 full time staff and 3 regional representatives</p>	<p>Combined core and project budgets total approximately US \$ 4 Million</p>	<p>The roster budget is approximately US \$350,000. 50% is covered by general funds and a DfID grant. The other 50% is covered by placement fees which range from US \$500-3000 depending on the position.</p>
Links with UN system?	<p>Informal contacts made on periodic visits to Geneva, New York and missions.</p>	<p>Contacts with DPKO in NY as well as close contact with UN peacekeeping missions. Partnered with UNIFEM for two conferences on gender justice in post conflict countries</p>	<p>RedR-IHE has placed people with UNICEF and UNHCR, but has not received any requests from DPKO.</p>